Resistance to extreme strategies, rather than prosocial preferences, can explain human cooperation in public goods games.
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Why humans might help strangersSubadult ravens generally don't transfer valuable tokens to conspecifics when there is nothing to gain for themselvesCorrelates of cooperation in a one-shot high-stakes televised prisoners' dilemma.A test of evolutionary policing theory with data from human societies.Exploring the effects of working for endowments on behaviour in standard economic games.Reflection does not undermine self-interested prosociality.Competition over personal resources favors contribution to shared resources in human groupsBetween-group competition, intra-group cooperation and relative performance.Prosocial preferences do not explain human cooperation in public-goods gamesBetween-group competition elicits within-group cooperation in children.Third-party punishers are rewarded, but third-party helpers even more so.Sharing of science is most likely among male scientistsReply to Skoyles: Misplaced assumptions of perfect human prosociality.Neural bases of ingroup altruistic motivation in soccer fans.Payoff-based learning explains the decline in cooperation in public goods games.Do humans really punish altruistically? A closer look.Helping in humans and other animals: a fruitful interdisciplinary dialogue.Local competition increases people's willingness to harm others.
P2860
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P2860
Resistance to extreme strategies, rather than prosocial preferences, can explain human cooperation in public goods games.
description
2010 nî lūn-bûn
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2010 թուականի Մայիսին հրատարակուած գիտական յօդուած
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2010 թվականի մայիսին հրատարակված գիտական հոդված
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2010年の論文
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2010年論文
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2010年論文
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2010年論文
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2010年論文
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2010年論文
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2010年论文
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name
Resistance to extreme strategi ...... eration in public goods games.
@ast
Resistance to extreme strategi ...... eration in public goods games.
@en
type
label
Resistance to extreme strategi ...... eration in public goods games.
@ast
Resistance to extreme strategi ...... eration in public goods games.
@en
prefLabel
Resistance to extreme strategi ...... eration in public goods games.
@ast
Resistance to extreme strategi ...... eration in public goods games.
@en
P2093
P2860
P356
P1476
Resistance to extreme strategi ...... eration in public goods games.
@en
P2093
Adin Ross-Gillespie
Maxwell N Burton-Chellew
Rolf Kümmerli
Stuart A West
P2860
P304
10125-10130
P356
10.1073/PNAS.1000829107
P407
P577
2010-05-17T00:00:00Z