Markets, religion, community size, and the evolution of fairness and punishment. - Wikidata - awgldk - TriplyDB

Markets, religion, community size, and the evolution of fairness and punishment.

Markets, religion, community size, and the evolution of fairness and punishment.

http://www.wikidata.org/entity/Q34105145

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Social cognition in schizophrenia: from social stimuli processing to social engagement Replication, Communication, and the Population Dynamics of Scientific Discovery Dynamic social networks promote cooperation in experiments with humans The nature and dynamics of world religions: a life-history approach Economic and evolutionary hypotheses for cross-population variation in parochialism Why humans might help strangers Religious and sacred imperatives in human conflict Camp stability predicts patterns of hunter-gatherer cooperation Social learning and the development of individual and group behaviour in mammal societies Chill-inducing music enhances altruism in humans.Both Isochronous and Non-Isochronous Metrical Subdivision Afford Precise and Stable Ensemble Entrainment: A Corpus Study of Malian Jembe Drumming.Choosy moral punishers Morals and markets.Activating a full architectural model: improving health through robust population health records.Looking Under the Hood of Third-Party Punishment Reveals Design for Personal Benefit.Evolutionary foundations of human prosocial sentiments.No third-party punishment in chimpanzees Ontogeny of prosocial behavior across diverse societies.War, space, and the evolution of Old World complex societies.Embers of society: Firelight talk among the Ju/'hoansi Bushmen.Predictable and predictive emotions: explaining cheap signals and trust re-extension.Neighborhood Deprivation Negatively Impacts Children's Prosocial Behavior Social Value Orientation and Capitalism in Societies Group Cooperation without Group Selection: Modest Punishment Can Recruit Much Cooperation.Trust, Punishment, and Cooperation Across 18 Societies: A Meta-Analysis.The Tsimane Health and Life History Project: Integrating anthropology and biomedicine On the psychology of cooperation in humans and other primates: combining the natural history and experimental evidence of prosociality Local competition sparks concerns for fairness in the ultimatum game Fair Topologies: Community Structures and Network Hubs Drive Emergence of Fairness Norms.Variation in cooperative behaviour within a single city.Culture and cooperation Reflection does not undermine self-interested prosociality.Conditional cooperation and costly monitoring explain success in forest commons management.Recipients affect prosocial and altruistic choices in jackdaws, Corvus monedula.Chimpanzees share food for many reasons: the role of kinship, reciprocity, social bonds and harassment on food transfers The social structure of cooperation and punishment.The hard problem of cooperation.Risking your life without a second thought: intuitive decision-making and extreme altruism Everybody else is doing it: exploring social transmission of lying behavior.From fear recognition to kidney donation

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Markets, religion, community size, and the evolution of fairness and punishment.

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description

2010 nî lūn-bûn

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2010 թուականի Մարտին հրատարակուած գիտական յօդուած

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2010 թվականի մարտին հրատարակված գիտական հոդված

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2010年の論文

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2010年論文

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2010年論文

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2010年論文

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2010年論文

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2010年論文

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2010年论文

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name

Markets, religion, community size, and the evolution of fairness and punishment.

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Markets, religion, community size, and the evolution of fairness and punishment.

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Markets, religion, community size, and the evolution of fairness and punishment.

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Markets, religion, community size, and the evolution of fairness and punishment.

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Markets, religion, community size, and the evolution of fairness and punishment.

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Markets, religion, community size, and the evolution of fairness and punishment.

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Markets, religion, community size, and the evolution of fairness and punishment.

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Markets, religion, community size, and the evolution of fairness and punishment.

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SCIENCE.1182238

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Markets, religion, community size, and the evolution of fairness and punishment

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Abigail Barr

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Alexander Bolyanatz

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Carolyn Lesorogol

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Clark Barrett

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David Tracer

http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string

Edwins Gwako

http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string

Frank Marlowe

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Jean Ensminger

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John Ziker

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Joseph Henrich

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P2860

The coevolution of ritual and society: new 14C dates from ancient Mexico.

Fairness versus reason in the ultimatum game.

Why people punish defectors. Weak conformist transmission can stabilize costly enforcement of norms in cooperative dilemmas.

Reward and punishment

Costly punishment across human societies.

The origin and evolution of religious prosociality.

Social neuroeconomics: the neural circuitry of social preferences.

Indirect reciprocity can stabilize cooperation without the second-order free rider problem.

Complex societies : The evolutionary origins of a crude superorganism.

A tale of two defectors: the importance of standing for evolution of indirect reciprocity.

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1480-1484

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10.1126/SCIENCE.1182238

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5972

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327

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Juan-Camilo Cardenas

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2010-03-01T00:00:00Z

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42345173

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