Rejection of unfair offers in the ultimatum game is no evidence of strong reciprocity. - Wikidata - awgldk - TriplyDB

Rejection of unfair offers in the ultimatum game is no evidence of strong reciprocity.

Rejection of unfair offers in the ultimatum game is no evidence of strong reciprocity.

http://www.wikidata.org/entity/Q34314130

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Stress potentiates decision biases: A stress induced deliberation-to-intuition (SIDI) model A neural trait approach to exploring individual differences in social preferences.Cooperative Behavior in the Ultimatum Game and Prisoner's Dilemma Depends on Players' Contributions Does competition really bring out the worst? Testosterone, social distance and inter-male competition shape parochial altruism in human males The role of self-interest in elite bargaining.In others' shoes: do individual differences in empathy and theory of mind shape social preferences?The Effect of Incentives and Meta-incentives on the Evolution of Cooperation.Influences of State and Trait Affect on Behavior, Feedback-Related Negativity, and P3b in the Ultimatum Game.Short- and long-run goals in ultimatum bargaining: impatience predicts spite-based behavior.Tend to Compare and Tend to Be Fair: The Relationship between Social Comparison Sensitivity and Justice Sensitivity.Prosocial Behavior Increases with Age across Five Economic Games.The cognitive basis of social behavior: cognitive reflection overrides antisocial but not always prosocial motives.Inter-Group Conflict and Cooperation: Field Experiments Before, During and After Sectarian Riots in Northern Ireland.Is costly punishment altruistic? Exploring rejection of unfair offers in the Ultimatum Game in real-world altruists.Stated and revealed inequality aversion in three subject pools.Heterogeneous Motives in the Trust Game: A Tale of Two Roles.Cortical thickness of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex predicts strategic choices in economic games.Prosocial Personality Traits Differentially Predict Egalitarianism, Generosity, and Reciprocity in Economic Games.Fear of Negative Evaluation Moderates the Effect of Subliminal Fear Priming on Rejection of Unfair Offers in the Ultimatum Game Behavioral and neuronal determinants of negative reciprocity in the ultimatum game.Computational substrates of social norm enforcement by unaffected third parties.Processing of fair and unfair offers in the ultimatum game under social observation.Emergence of communities and diversity in social networks.Impact of Short Social Training on Prosocial Behaviors: An fMRI Study Cooperation, Fast and Slow: Meta-Analytic Evidence for a Theory of Social Heuristics and Self-Interested Deliberation.Caring Cooperators and Powerful Punishers: Differential Effects of Induced Care and Power Motivation on Different Types of Economic Decision Making.Fair and unfair punishers coexist in the Ultimatum Game.The Development of Theory of Mind and Positive and Negative Reciprocity in Preschool Children.Reply to Jensen et al.: Equitable offers are not rationally maximizing.Need for conclusive evidence that positive and negative reciprocity are unrelated.Reply to Egloff et al.: On the relationship between positive and negative reciprocity.Activity in the nucleus accumbens and amygdala underlies individual differences in prosocial and individualistic economic choices.Behavioural Differences and Neural Substrates of Altruistic and Spiteful Punishment.No Robust Association between Static Markers of Testosterone and Facets of Socio-Economic Decision Making.Cooperation, clustering, and assortative mixing in dynamic networks.Costly retaliation is promoted by threats to resources in women and threats to status in men.From good institutions to generous citizens: Top-down incentives to cooperate promote subsequent prosociality but not norm enforcement.Humans display a 'cooperative phenotype' that is domain general and temporally stable.The Traits One Can Trust: Dissecting Reciprocity and Kindness as Determinants of Trustworthy Behavior.The value of vengeance and the demand for deterrence.

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P2860

Rejection of unfair offers in the ultimatum game is no evidence of strong reciprocity.

http://www.wikidata.org/entity/Q34314130

description

2012 nî lūn-bûn

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2012 թուականի Նոյեմբերին հրատարակուած գիտական յօդուած

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2012 թվականի նոյեմբերին հրատարակված գիտական հոդված

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2012年の論文

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2012年論文

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2012年論文

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2012年論文

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2012年论文

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name

Rejection of unfair offers in the ultimatum game is no evidence of strong reciprocity.

@ast

Rejection of unfair offers in the ultimatum game is no evidence of strong reciprocity.

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Rejection of unfair offers in the ultimatum game is no evidence of strong reciprocity.

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type

label

Rejection of unfair offers in the ultimatum game is no evidence of strong reciprocity.

@ast

Rejection of unfair offers in the ultimatum game is no evidence of strong reciprocity.

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Rejection of unfair offers in the ultimatum game is no evidence of strong reciprocity.

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prefLabel

Rejection of unfair offers in the ultimatum game is no evidence of strong reciprocity.

@ast

Rejection of unfair offers in the ultimatum game is no evidence of strong reciprocity.

@en

Rejection of unfair offers in the ultimatum game is no evidence of strong reciprocity.

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Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America

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Rejection of unfair offers in the ultimatum game is no evidence of strong reciprocity.

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Arisa Miura

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Dora Simunovic

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Haruto Takagishi

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Hirofumi Hashimoto

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Keigo Inukai

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Mizuho Shinada

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Nobuhiro Mifune

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Toshio Yamagishi

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Yang Li

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Yutaka Horita

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P2860

Testosterone administration decreases generosity in the ultimatum game

The Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism

Prosocials prefer equal outcomes to maximizing joint outcomes.

The evolution of altruistic punishment

Emotion expression in human punishment behavior.

Reciprocity: weak or strong? What punishment experiments do (and do not) demonstrate.

The nature of human altruism.

The evolution of strong reciprocity: cooperation in heterogeneous populations.

Evolution of indirect reciprocity.

The competitive advantage of sanctioning institutions.

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