Optimal interdependence between networks for the evolution of cooperation.
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Influence of reciprocal links in social networksPunishment based on public benefit fund significantly promotes cooperationAsymmetric interaction paired with a super-rational strategy might resolve the tragedy of the commons without requiring recognition or negotiationModelling and computation in the valuation of carbon derivatives with stochastic convenience yields.Swarm intelligence inspired shills and the evolution of cooperationInfluences of agents with a self-reputation awareness component in an evolutionary spatial IPD game.Multilevel Evolutionary Algorithm that Optimizes the Structure of Scale-Free Networks for the Promotion of Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma game.Synchronization in output-coupled temporal Boolean networks.Conformity enhances network reciprocity in evolutionary social dilemmas.Improving the robustness of complex networks with preserving community structureModerate intra-group bias maximizes cooperation on interdependent populations.Role of investment heterogeneity in the cooperation on spatial public goods game.Spatial evolutionary public goods game on complete graph and dense complex networks.Emergence of super cooperation of prisoner's dilemma games on scale-free networks.Effect of heterogeneous investments on the evolution of cooperation in spatial public goods game.Heterogeneous Coupling between Interdependent Lattices Promotes the Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma GameModeling and Computation of Transboundary Industrial Pollution with Emission Permits Trading by Stochastic Differential Game.Interdependencies and Causalities in Coupled Financial Networks.Synchronization Analysis of Master-Slave Probabilistic Boolean Networks.Multiple effect of social influence on cooperation in interdependent network games.Utility Evaluation Based on One-To-N Mapping in the Prisoner's Dilemma Game for Interdependent Networks.The Emergence of Relationship-based Cooperation.Cooperation in group-structured populations with two layers of interactions.The Evolution of Cooperation is Affected by the Persistence of Fitness Effects, the Neighborhood Size and their InteractionThe robustness of multiplex networks under layer node-based attack.Reciprocity in spatial evolutionary public goods game on double-layered network.Spontaneous symmetry breaking in interdependent networked game.Evolutionary origin of asymptotically stable consensus.Biased imitation in coupled evolutionary games in interdependent networks.Local immunization strategy based on the scores of nodes.Correlations between weights and overlap in ensembles of weighted multiplex networks.Reconstructing complex network for characterizing the time-varying causality evolution behavior of multivariate time series.Learning and coordinating in a multilayer network.Effect of initial fraction of cooperators on cooperative behavior in evolutionary prisoner's dilemma gameCriticality triggers the emergence of collective intelligence in groups.Degree mixing in multilayer networks impedes the evolution of cooperation.Peer pressure: enhancement of cooperation through mutual punishment.Boosting cooperation by involving extortion in spatial prisoner's dilemma games.Measuring and modeling correlations in multiplex networks.Nonlinear growth and condensation in multiplex networks.
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Optimal interdependence between networks for the evolution of cooperation.
description
article científic
@ca
article scientifique
@fr
articolo scientifico
@it
artigo científico
@pt
bilimsel makale
@tr
scientific article published on January 2013
@en
vedecký článok
@sk
vetenskaplig artikel
@sv
videnskabelig artikel
@da
vědecký článek
@cs
name
Optimal interdependence between networks for the evolution of cooperation.
@en
Optimal interdependence between networks for the evolution of cooperation.
@nl
type
label
Optimal interdependence between networks for the evolution of cooperation.
@en
Optimal interdependence between networks for the evolution of cooperation.
@nl
prefLabel
Optimal interdependence between networks for the evolution of cooperation.
@en
Optimal interdependence between networks for the evolution of cooperation.
@nl
P2093
P2860
P356
P1433
P1476
Optimal interdependence between networks for the evolution of cooperation.
@en
P2093
Attila Szolnoki
Matjaž Perc
P2860
P2888
P356
10.1038/SREP02470
P407
P577
2013-01-01T00:00:00Z
P5875
P6179
1026442343