No strategy is evolutionarily stable in the repeated prisoner's dilemma.
about
Mechanistic constraints and the unlikely evolution of reciprocal cooperation.Types of evolutionary stability and the problem of cooperation.Collapse of cooperation in evolving gamesA strategy with novel evolutionary features for the iterated prisoner's dilemma.An Open Framework for the Reproducible Study of the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma
P2860
No strategy is evolutionarily stable in the repeated prisoner's dilemma.
description
1994 nî lūn-bûn
@nan
1994年の論文
@ja
1994年論文
@yue
1994年論文
@zh-hant
1994年論文
@zh-hk
1994年論文
@zh-mo
1994年論文
@zh-tw
1994年论文
@wuu
1994年论文
@zh
1994年论文
@zh-cn
name
No strategy is evolutionarily stable in the repeated prisoner's dilemma.
@en
type
label
No strategy is evolutionarily stable in the repeated prisoner's dilemma.
@en
prefLabel
No strategy is evolutionarily stable in the repeated prisoner's dilemma.
@en
P356
P1476
No strategy is evolutionarily stable in the repeated prisoner's dilemma.
@en
P2093
Lorberbaum J
P304
P356
10.1006/JTBI.1994.1092
P407
P577
1994-05-01T00:00:00Z