about
Reproductive competition triggers mass eviction in cooperative banded mongoosesConfrontational scavenging as a possible source for language and cooperationTo qualify as a social partner, humans hide severe punishment, although their observed cooperativeness is decisiveCorrelates of cooperation in a one-shot high-stakes televised prisoners' dilemma.Trust, Punishment, and Cooperation Across 18 Societies: A Meta-Analysis.No evidence for punishment in communally nursing female house mice (Mus musculus domesticus).Sanctions as honest signals--the evolution of pool punishment by public sanctioning institutions.A test of evolutionary policing theory with data from human societies.Special agents can promote cooperation in the populationBoth loved and feared: third party punishers are viewed as formidable and likeable, but these reputational benefits may only be open to dominant individuals.The co-evolution of fairness preferences and costly punishment.Toward an experimental exploration of the complexity of human social interactionsSolving the second-order free rider problem in a public goods game: An experiment using a leader support systemExamining punishment at different explanatory levels.Cognitive systems for revenge and forgiveness.When is bigger better? The effects of group size on the evolution of helping behaviours.Third-party punishers are rewarded, but third-party helpers even more so.Punish the thief-coevolution of defense and cautiousness stabilizes ownership.Antisocial rewarding in structured populations.Stochasticity in economic losses increases the value of reputation in indirect reciprocity.Emergence of responsible sanctions without second order free riders, antisocial punishment or spite.Human cooperation based on punishment reputation.Punishing for your own good: the case of reputation-based cooperation.Love or fear: can punishment promote cooperation?Lab support for strong reciprocity is weak: punishing for reputation rather than cooperation.Moral parochialism and contextual contingency across seven societies.The evolution of anti-social rewarding and its countermeasures in public goods games.High strength-of-ties and low mobility enable the evolution of third-party punishment.Cooperation on dynamic networks within an uncertain reputation environment.Fourth-Party Evaluation of Third-Party Pro-social Help and Punishment: An ERP Study.The emergence and selection of reputation systems that drive cooperative behaviourExposure to superfluous information reduces cooperation and increases antisocial punishment in reputation-based interactions
P2860
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P2860
description
2010 nî lūn-bûn
@nan
2010年の論文
@ja
2010年学术文章
@wuu
2010年学术文章
@zh
2010年学术文章
@zh-cn
2010年学术文章
@zh-hans
2010年学术文章
@zh-my
2010年学术文章
@zh-sg
2010年學術文章
@yue
2010年學術文章
@zh-hant
name
The evolution of punishment through reputation.
@en
The evolution of punishment through reputation.
@nl
type
label
The evolution of punishment through reputation.
@en
The evolution of punishment through reputation.
@nl
prefLabel
The evolution of punishment through reputation.
@en
The evolution of punishment through reputation.
@nl
P2860
P356
P1476
The evolution of punishment through reputation.
@en
P2093
Miguel dos Santos
P2860
P304
P356
10.1098/RSPB.2010.1275
P577
2010-08-18T00:00:00Z