Effect of spatial structure on the evolution of cooperation.
about
Cooperation, norms, and revolutions: a unified game-theoretical approachGreed and Fear in Network Reciprocity: Implications for Cooperation among OrganizationsThe fate of cooperation during range expansionsHeterogeneous networks do not promote cooperation when humans play a Prisoner's Dilemma.First carrot, then stick: how the adaptive hybridization of incentives promotes cooperation.How wealth accumulation can promote cooperation.Social experiments in the mesoscale: humans playing a spatial prisoner's dilemma.Topological traps control flow on real networks: the case of coordination failures.Effects of punishment in a mobile population playing the prisoner's dilemma game.Inferring reputation promotes the evolution of cooperation in spatial social dilemma gamesBipartite graphs as models of population structures in evolutionary multiplayer gamesAspiration dynamics in structured population acts as if in a well-mixed one.Direct sum matrix game with prisoner's dilemma and snowdrift game.Cooperation in networks where the learning environment differs from the interaction environment.How mutation affects evolutionary games on graphs.Effect of resource spatial correlation and hunter-fisher-gatherer mobility on social cooperation in Tierra del FuegoImpact of small groups with heterogeneous preference on behavioral evolution in population evacuation.Conditional cooperation can hinder network reciprocity.The cognitive basis of social behavior: cognitive reflection overrides antisocial but not always prosocial motives.Reciprocity in spatial evolutionary public goods game on double-layered network.Coevolution of Cooperation and Partner Rewiring Range in Spatial Social Networks.Genetic drift opposes mutualism during spatial population expansion.Biased imitation in coupled evolutionary games in interdependent networks.Network Modularity is essential for evolution of cooperation under uncertainty.Effects of Network Characteristics on Reaching the Payoff-Dominant Equilibrium in Coordination Games: A Simulation study.Human behavior in Prisoner's Dilemma experiments suppresses network reciprocity.Game theory in models of pedestrian room evacuation.Evolutionary shift dynamics on a cycle.Inertia in strategy switching transforms the strategy evolution.Static cooperator-defector patterns in models of the snowdrift game played on cycle graphs.Microbial expansion-collision dynamics promote cooperation and coexistence on surfaces.How costly punishment, diversity, and density of connectivity influence cooperation in a biological network.Network effects on coordination in asymmetric games.Measures of success in a class of evolutionary models with fixed population size and structure.Role-separating ordering in social dilemmas controlled by topological frustration.Social imitation versus strategic choice, or consensus versus cooperation, in the networked Prisoner's Dilemma.Peer pressure: enhancement of cooperation through mutual punishment.Stochastic win-stay-lose-shift strategy with dynamic aspirations in evolutionary social dilemmas.Relationship between clustering coefficient and the success of cooperation in networks.Replicator dynamics with diffusion on multiplex networks.
P2860
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P2860
Effect of spatial structure on the evolution of cooperation.
description
2009 nî lūn-bûn
@nan
2009年の論文
@ja
2009年学术文章
@wuu
2009年学术文章
@zh
2009年学术文章
@zh-cn
2009年学术文章
@zh-hans
2009年学术文章
@zh-my
2009年学术文章
@zh-sg
2009年學術文章
@yue
2009年學術文章
@zh-hant
name
Effect of spatial structure on the evolution of cooperation.
@en
Effect of spatial structure on the evolution of cooperation.
@nl
type
label
Effect of spatial structure on the evolution of cooperation.
@en
Effect of spatial structure on the evolution of cooperation.
@nl
prefLabel
Effect of spatial structure on the evolution of cooperation.
@en
Effect of spatial structure on the evolution of cooperation.
@nl
P2860
P1433
P1476
Effect of spatial structure on the evolution of cooperation.
@en
P2093
Angel Sánchez
José A Cuesta
P2860
P304
P356
10.1103/PHYSREVE.80.046106
P407
P433
P577
2009-10-08T00:00:00Z