about
Fortune favours the bold: an agent-based model reveals adaptive advantages of overconfidence in warThe evolution of overconfidenceOil prices and interstate conflictWar Signals: A Theory of Trade, Trust, and ConflictWhat determines the duration of war? Insights from assessment strategies in animal contests.Networks of military alliances, wars, and international trade.A model for warfare in stratified small-scale societies: The effect of within-group inequality.The role of threats in animal cooperation.The impact of coups d’état on civil war durationRecouping after Coup-Proofing: Compromised Military Effectiveness and Strategic SubstitutionMilitarism and globalization: Is there an empirical link?Neoclassical Realism in the North Atlantic: Explaining Behaviors and Outcomes in the Cod WarsIs Strategy an Illusion?Where Is International Relations Going? Evidence from Graduate TrainingDeconstructing Mediation: A Case Study of the Cod WarsCommentary on the Special IssueBullets for Ballots: Electoral Participation Provisions and Enduring Peace after Civil ConflictThe Effects of Political Similarity on the Onset of Militarized Disputes, 1816-1985What Terrorists Really Want: Terrorist Motives and Counterterrorism StrategyTwo Cheers for Bargaining Theory: Assessing Rationalist Explanations of the Iraq WarFrom Melos to Baghdad: Explaining Resistance to Militarized Challenges from More Powerful States1To Concede or to Resist? The Restraining Effect of Military AlliancesFirst Things First: The Pressing Danger of Crisis Instability in U.S.-China RelationsLiving by the Sword and Dying by the Sword? Leadership Transitions in and out of DictatorshipsNonstate Actors, Fragmentation, and Conflict ProcessesHow Could Trade Affect Conflict?The trouble with carrots: Transaction costs, conflict expectations, and economic inducementsThe devoted actor’s will to fight and the spiritual dimension of human conflictFrom Climate Change to Conflict? No Consensus YetInternational Crises and the Capitalist PeaceCapitalism, Commitment, and PeaceUnderstanding Civil War: A Comparison of Tajikistan and UzbekistanDead certain: confidence and conservatism predict aggression in simulated international crisis decision-makingUnrest Assured: Why Unipolarity Is Not PeacefulInformation Sharing in Early Stage International Disputes: How China and Japan CommunicateBook Review: War and Punishment: The Causes of War Termination and the First World WarHard Balancing in the Age of American Unipolarity: The Russian Response to US Ballistic Missile Defense during the Bush Administration (2001–2008)Protracted Stalemates and Conflict Intervention: Policy(Un)Learning and the Cyprus–EU DebacleTwisting arms and sending messagesData and progress in peace and conflict research
P2860
Q27335256-4BCEF12F-B36E-4D77-AE11-F9952D18EE27Q28248208-5508D375-5DBF-4FC3-B3E5-B310D81F2EDFQ29398665-41AD4270-F74F-4E51-AE81-4DC5066EA87EQ29541079-7D54AA56-1F8C-4DC9-8596-B7CC8660A70EQ34232664-CE798980-3BCE-4EBF-9F44-A9326DC59FBFQ36394388-36D1C501-85CF-4527-8C46-37263DDE547AQ47168858-D40376A1-5637-4D60-9A89-645DCC47D440Q51621956-03A4856D-4353-4D70-934A-FDAEE407D61EQ53983671-D39F1CD9-D0DE-49FD-9677-0630607817FEQ53983704-F18041B2-79FD-4B2E-BCEE-AC886046B219Q55130313-E5929732-D9A3-4643-B475-E74D2A748E5AQ55922692-A18C193B-E44A-4E1F-9849-2089E8E314FCQ55934763-91E31768-3417-42F8-BA9C-B78AAEE165FBQ55968049-149B6A7D-82C3-428E-89CB-FDD4415CD255Q55969855-4A18A445-0797-4FEC-A890-A852B7EE49FEQ56005032-131631BB-6860-4392-8231-61710FD9BE36Q56018757-35C2DF72-67CB-4D27-B2E0-BD4B5AB25F84Q56019435-4D80DE5E-751B-4E33-9F0D-5BCACA3E04ADQ56067156-29AB3507-889D-4225-B4DD-14FCD46632ECQ56068137-5713A717-C43A-4EFC-B692-BE59139DD643Q56082847-B405525C-FCE8-4A9C-ABF6-0C503DBB80DCQ56093824-7A642C5F-35DD-42D0-AF7C-9B96D1BA4272Q56211702-035165EE-169C-4F8F-AD31-A5E60B587AF6Q56227106-DF8E3B70-D3F5-4563-B603-AA0D2AB674CEQ56431554-D85E4A5B-1410-44CD-9855-02DBB0DE4282Q56518964-051DD252-CF1A-4990-9B68-B0EC46DDB4E9Q56551197-691904FF-FFB1-455B-AC2B-F61CF422A7EDQ56608687-EEC23DDA-DB09-4300-B6DC-EF2AF8F8AA96Q56625371-711B9492-3BB5-454F-947C-33F254190104Q56807642-07352AF1-A49B-4F7A-80F7-067F0993C36DQ56807643-EED3CCF8-731E-491A-A41F-D7E021804BECQ56838541-620E4865-3D15-4BC0-A293-9015E9F35D96Q57097880-D7E709F5-B242-4EA4-A9D6-B7F906CB1C03Q57276145-B9AAA7DF-C83B-4C8B-AE2C-F92AC851A906Q57441884-57BD46C4-A014-4389-B26A-3DE50B34D3AEQ57528098-620658CF-3B01-48CD-956D-2397E3A8A2E4Q58006055-7073D2A7-7E22-41D0-88B5-DA88BB41122CQ58195470-0F7916AB-318D-4C7C-B42B-1BFAB458E8D0Q58218397-3D0009CF-A652-44A1-8CF3-D0EB03EABE8CQ58218407-9F621A10-3732-4ED0-BBC6-3A63F8C576EF
P2860
description
im Juni 1995 veröffentlichter wissenschaftlicher Artikel
@de
wetenschappelijk artikel
@nl
наукова стаття, опублікована в червні 1995
@uk
name
Rationalist explanations for war
@en
Rationalist explanations for war
@nl
type
label
Rationalist explanations for war
@en
Rationalist explanations for war
@nl
prefLabel
Rationalist explanations for war
@en
Rationalist explanations for war
@nl
P1476
Rationalist explanations for war
@en
P2093
James D. Fearon
P356
10.1017/S0020818300033324
P50
P577
1995-06-01T00:00:00Z