Naive probability: a mental model theory of extensional reasoning.
about
Comprehension and computation in Bayesian problem solvingReasoning and choice in the Monty Hall Dilemma (MHD): implications for improving Bayesian reasoningGood fences make for good neighbors but bad science: a review of what improves Bayesian reasoning and whyImaging deductive reasoning and the new paradigmIntuitions of probabilities shape expectations about the future at 12 months and beyond.Mental models and human reasoning.The probabilities of unique events.Probabilistic cognition in two indigenous Mayan groupsBase-rate respect: From ecological rationality to dual processes.Basic understanding of posterior probability.On Bayesian problem-solving: helping Bayesians solve simple Bayesian word problemsDiscounting and Augmentation in Causal Conditional Reasoning: Causal Models or Shallow Encoding?The heuristic-analytic theory of reasoning: extension and evaluation.Should we ask our Children about Sex, Drugs and Rock & Roll?: Potentially Harmful Effects of Asking Questions About Risky Behaviors.Reasoning with conditionals: does every counterexample count? It's frequency that counts.The difference between generating counter examples and using them during reasoning.Counterexamples in sentential reasoning.Inference suppression and semantic memory retrieval: every counterexample counts.Reasoning as we read: establishing the probability of causal conditionals.Considering too few alternatives: The mental model theory of extensional reasoning.Pure reasoning in 12-month-old infants as probabilistic inference.The equiprobability bias from a mathematical and psychological perspective.Rationality, the Bayesian standpoint, and the Monty-Hall problem.Understanding cumulative risk.Partition priming in judgment under uncertainty.Use of base rates and case cue information in making likelihood estimates.Background beliefs in Bayesian inference.Iffy beliefs: conditional thinking and belief change.Comparing the meanings of "if" and "all".The balance beam metaphor: a perspective on clinical diagnosis.Another chance for good reasoning.When questions change behavior: the role of ease of representation.The diversity effect in diagnostic reasoning.Additional evidence for a dual-strategy model of reasoning: Probabilistic reasoning is more invariant than reasoning about logical validity.Naive Probability: Model-Based Estimates of Unique Events.Using statistical reasoning performance to reveal information parsing preferences in the mind.Comparisons, mental models, and the action effect in judgments of regret.Learning inhibition in the Monty Hall problem: the role of dysfunctional counterfactual prescriptions.Overcoming illusory inferences in a probabilistic counterintuitive problem: the role of explicit representations.When and for whom do frequencies facilitate performance? On the role of numerical literacy.
P2860
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P2860
Naive probability: a mental model theory of extensional reasoning.
description
1999 nî lūn-bûn
@nan
1999 թուականի Յունուարին հրատարակուած գիտական յօդուած
@hyw
1999 թվականի հունվարին հրատարակված գիտական հոդված
@hy
1999年の論文
@ja
1999年論文
@yue
1999年論文
@zh-hant
1999年論文
@zh-hk
1999年論文
@zh-mo
1999年論文
@zh-tw
1999年论文
@wuu
name
Naive probability: a mental model theory of extensional reasoning.
@ast
Naive probability: a mental model theory of extensional reasoning.
@en
type
label
Naive probability: a mental model theory of extensional reasoning.
@ast
Naive probability: a mental model theory of extensional reasoning.
@en
prefLabel
Naive probability: a mental model theory of extensional reasoning.
@ast
Naive probability: a mental model theory of extensional reasoning.
@en
P2093
P1433
P1476
Naive probability: a mental model theory of extensional reasoning.
@en
P2093
Caverni JP
Johnson-Laird PN
Legrenzi MS
Legrenzi P
P356
10.1037/0033-295X.106.1.62
P577
1999-01-01T00:00:00Z