A general approach for population games with application to vaccination.
about
Behavioural change models for infectious disease transmission: a systematic review (2010-2015)The influence of social norms on the dynamics of vaccinating behaviour for paediatric infectious diseasesWhen does overuse of antibiotics become a tragedy of the commons?Game theory of social distancing in response to an epidemic.Conflicts of interest during contact investigations: a game-theoretic analysis.Effects of behavioral response and vaccination policy on epidemic spreading--an approach based on evolutionary-game dynamics.Imperfect vaccine aggravates the long-standing dilemma of voluntary vaccinationEvolutionary game theory and social learning can determine how vaccine scares unfold.The interplay of public intervention and private choices in determining the outcome of vaccination programmes.A computational approach to characterizing the impact of social influence on individuals' vaccination decision making.The influence of altruism on influenza vaccination decisions.On the existence of a threshold for preventive behavioral responses to suppress epidemic spreading.Factors mediating seasonal and influenza A (H1N1) vaccine acceptance among ethnically diverse populations in the urban south.Mitigation of epidemics in contact networks through optimal contact adaptation.Dueling biological and social contagions.A belief-based model for characterizing the spread of awareness and its impacts on individuals' vaccination decisions.Antibiotic resistance as collateral damage: the tragedy of the commons in a two-disease setting.Provisioning of Public Health Can Be Designed to Anticipate Public Policy Responses.Individual Vaccination as Nash Equilibrium in a SIR Model with Application to the 2009-2010 Influenza A (H1N1) Epidemic in France.Local immunization program for susceptible-infected-recovered network epidemic model.Bounded rationality alters the dynamics of paediatric immunization acceptance.Disease control through voluntary vaccination decisions based on the smoothed best response.Impacts of subsidy policies on vaccination decisions in contact networks.Equilibria of an epidemic game with piecewise linear social distancing cost.Vaccination, herd behavior, and herd immunity.Outcome inelasticity and outcome variability in behaviour-incidence models: an example from an SEIR infection on a dynamic network.Bistability of Evolutionary Stable Vaccination Strategies in the Reinfection SIRI Model.Imitation dynamics of vaccine decision-making behaviours based on the game theory.Games of age-dependent prevention of chronic infections by social distancing.Epidemic Spreading with Heterogeneous Awareness on Human Networks
P2860
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P2860
A general approach for population games with application to vaccination.
description
2011 nî lūn-bûn
@nan
2011年の論文
@ja
2011年論文
@yue
2011年論文
@zh-hant
2011年論文
@zh-hk
2011年論文
@zh-mo
2011年論文
@zh-tw
2011年论文
@wuu
2011年论文
@zh
2011年论文
@zh-cn
name
A general approach for population games with application to vaccination.
@en
A general approach for population games with application to vaccination.
@nl
type
label
A general approach for population games with application to vaccination.
@en
A general approach for population games with application to vaccination.
@nl
prefLabel
A general approach for population games with application to vaccination.
@en
A general approach for population games with application to vaccination.
@nl
P2860
P1476
A general approach for population games with application to vaccination.
@en
P2860
P356
10.1016/J.MBS.2011.01.003
P577
2011-01-28T00:00:00Z