about
Dynamic social networks promote cooperation in experiments with humansImitation dynamics of vaccination behaviour on social networksEvolutionary establishment of moral and double moral standards through spatial interactionsGroup Size Effect on Cooperation in One-Shot Social Dilemmas II: Curvilinear EffectEvolutionary models of in-group favoritismSocial cycling and conditional responses in the Rock-Paper-Scissors gameHeterogeneous networks do not promote cooperation when humans play a Prisoner's Dilemma.Evolution of global cooperation driven by risks.A strategic interaction model of punishment favoring contagion of honest behavior.Learning dynamics explains human behaviour in prisoner's dilemma on networksThe Inevitability of Ethnocentrism Revisited: Ethnocentrism Diminishes As Mobility IncreasesEvolution of cooperation under indirect reciprocity and arbitrary exploration rates.Onymity promotes cooperation in social dilemma experiments.How wealth accumulation can promote cooperation.Social experiments in the mesoscale: humans playing a spatial prisoner's dilemma.The future of social experimentingImperfect vaccine aggravates the long-standing dilemma of voluntary vaccinationMoving away from nasty encounters enhances cooperation in ecological prisoner's dilemma game.Network homophily and the evolution of the pay-it-forward reciprocity.Effects of punishment in a mobile population playing the prisoner's dilemma game.Prosperity is associated with instability in dynamical networks.The impact of imitation on vaccination behavior in social contact networks.The structure of mutations and the evolution of cooperation.Experimental subjects are not different.Inferring reputation promotes the evolution of cooperation in spatial social dilemma gamesKnow thy neighbor: costly information can hurt cooperation in dynamic networks.Influence of opinion dynamics on the evolution of gamesConsistent strategy updating in spatial and non-spatial behavioral experiments does not promote cooperation in social networksThe co-evolution of fairness preferences and costly punishment.Static network structure can stabilize human cooperationEvolution of cooperation in a heterogeneous graph: fixation probabilities under weak selection.Effects of conformism on the cultural evolution of social behaviour.Aspiration dynamics in structured population acts as if in a well-mixed one.Emergence of social cohesion in a model society of greedy, mobile individuals.How mutation affects evolutionary games on graphs.Focus on the success of others leads to selfish behaviorAspiration-based partner switching boosts cooperation in social dilemmasThe effects of reputational and social knowledge on cooperation.Emergence of super cooperation of prisoner's dilemma games on scale-free networks.Bayesian decision making in human collectives with binary choices.
P2860
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P2860
description
2010 nî lūn-bûn
@nan
2010 թուականի Փետրուարին հրատարակուած գիտական յօդուած
@hyw
2010 թվականի փետրվարին հրատարակված գիտական հոդված
@hy
2010年の論文
@ja
2010年論文
@yue
2010年論文
@zh-hant
2010年論文
@zh-hk
2010年論文
@zh-mo
2010年論文
@zh-tw
2010年论文
@wuu
name
Human strategy updating in evolutionary games
@ast
Human strategy updating in evolutionary games
@en
type
label
Human strategy updating in evolutionary games
@ast
Human strategy updating in evolutionary games
@en
prefLabel
Human strategy updating in evolutionary games
@ast
Human strategy updating in evolutionary games
@en
P2093
P2860
P356
P1476
Human strategy updating in evolutionary games
@en
P2093
Arne Traulsen
Dirk Semmann
Hans-Jürgen Krambeck
Manfred Milinski
Ralf D Sommerfeld
P2860
P304
P356
10.1073/PNAS.0912515107
P577
2010-02-08T00:00:00Z