Gossip as an alternative for direct observation in games of indirect reciprocity.
about
Why humans might help strangersThe Impact of Third-Party Information on Trust: Valence, Source, and ReliabilityShame and honour drive cooperationThe superorganism account of human sociality: how and when human groups are like beehives.To qualify as a social partner, humans hide severe punishment, although their observed cooperativeness is decisiveGroupwise information sharing promotes ingroup favoritism in indirect reciprocity.Evolution of cooperation under indirect reciprocity and arbitrary exploration rates.Cooperation under indirect reciprocity and imitative trust.Strength of social tie predicts cooperative investment in a human social network.Indirect reciprocity under incomplete observation.The evolution of reputation-based partner-switching behaviors with a costExploring the effects of working for endowments on behaviour in standard economic games.How is human cooperation different?Children's use of communicative intent in the selection of cooperative partnersDynamical models explaining social balance and evolution of cooperation.Reputation Effects in Public and Private Interactions.Social Norms of Cooperation in Small-Scale Societies.Deception Undermines the Stability of Cooperation in Games of Indirect Reciprocity.Investigating the Effect of Gaze Cues and Emotional Expressions on the Affective Evaluations of Unfamiliar Faces.Multiple reputation domains and cooperative behaviour in two Latin American communitiesGossip Versus Punishment: The Efficiency of Reputation to Promote and Maintain CooperationPowering up with indirect reciprocity in a large-scale field experiment.Reputation-based partner choice promotes cooperation in social networks.Spatial location in brief, free-viewing face encoding modulates contextual face recognition.Evolution of gossip-based indirect reciprocity on a bipartite network.Moral assessment in indirect reciprocity.Evil acts and malicious gossip: a multiagent model of the effects of gossip in socially distributed person perception.When is bigger better? The effects of group size on the evolution of helping behaviours.Selective Cooperation in the Supermarket : Field Experimental Evidence for Indirect Reciprocity.Tolerant indirect reciprocity can boost social welfare through solidarity with unconditional cooperators in private monitoring.Could shame and honor save cooperation?Threats to the integrity of the Croatian Medical Journal.The miracle of peer review and development in science: an agent-based model.Gossip and ostracism promote cooperation in groups.The Sense of Commitment in Human-Robot Interaction.Evidence of direct reciprocity, but not of indirect and generalized reciprocity, in the grooming exchanges of wild Barbary macaques (Macaca sylvanus).Preschoolers affect others' reputations through prosocial gossip.Investigating the Potential Impact of Social Talk on Prevention Through Social Networks: the Relationships Between Social Talk and Refusal Self-Efficacy and Norms.Young children care more about their reputation with ingroup members and potential reciprocators.Tell me the gossip: the self-evaluative function of receiving gossip about others.
P2860
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P2860
Gossip as an alternative for direct observation in games of indirect reciprocity.
description
2007 nî lūn-bûn
@nan
2007 թուականի Հոկտեմբերին հրատարակուած գիտական յօդուած
@hyw
2007 թվականի հոտեմբերին հրատարակված գիտական հոդված
@hy
2007年の論文
@ja
2007年論文
@yue
2007年論文
@zh-hant
2007年論文
@zh-hk
2007年論文
@zh-mo
2007年論文
@zh-tw
2007年论文
@wuu
name
Gossip as an alternative for direct observation in games of indirect reciprocity.
@ast
Gossip as an alternative for direct observation in games of indirect reciprocity.
@en
Gossip as an alternative for direct observation in games of indirect reciprocity.
@nl
type
label
Gossip as an alternative for direct observation in games of indirect reciprocity.
@ast
Gossip as an alternative for direct observation in games of indirect reciprocity.
@en
Gossip as an alternative for direct observation in games of indirect reciprocity.
@nl
prefLabel
Gossip as an alternative for direct observation in games of indirect reciprocity.
@ast
Gossip as an alternative for direct observation in games of indirect reciprocity.
@en
Gossip as an alternative for direct observation in games of indirect reciprocity.
@nl
P2093
P2860
P356
P1476
Gossip as an alternative for direct observation in games of indirect reciprocity.
@en
P2093
Dirk Semmann
Hans-Jürgen Krambeck
Manfred Milinski
Ralf D Sommerfeld
P2860
P304
17435-17440
P356
10.1073/PNAS.0704598104
P407
P577
2007-10-18T00:00:00Z