THE RESPONSE OF DRUG EXPENDITURE TO NON-LINEAR CONTRACT DESIGN: EVIDENCE FROM MEDICARE PART D.
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MORAL HAZARD IN HEALTH INSURANCE: DO DYNAMIC INCENTIVES MATTER?The moral hazard effects of consumer responses to targeted cost-sharing.Health care demand elasticities by type of service.Bunching at the kink: implications for spending responses to health insurance contracts.Beyond Statistics: The Economic Content of Risk Scores.Private provision of social insurance: drug-specific price elasticities and cost sharing in Medicare Part D
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THE RESPONSE OF DRUG EXPENDITURE TO NON-LINEAR CONTRACT DESIGN: EVIDENCE FROM MEDICARE PART D.
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THE RESPONSE OF DRUG EXPENDITU ...... EVIDENCE FROM MEDICARE PART D.
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THE RESPONSE OF DRUG EXPENDITU ...... EVIDENCE FROM MEDICARE PART D.
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THE RESPONSE OF DRUG EXPENDITU ...... EVIDENCE FROM MEDICARE PART D.
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THE RESPONSE OF DRUG EXPENDITU ...... EVIDENCE FROM MEDICARE PART D.
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THE RESPONSE OF DRUG EXPENDITU ...... EVIDENCE FROM MEDICARE PART D.
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THE RESPONSE OF DRUG EXPENDITU ...... EVIDENCE FROM MEDICARE PART D.
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P2860
P356
P1476
THE RESPONSE OF DRUG EXPENDITU ...... EVIDENCE FROM MEDICARE PART D.
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P2093
Liran Einav
Paul Schrimpf
P2860
P304
P356
10.1093/QJE/QJV005
P577
2015-02-08T00:00:00Z