Evolutionary graph theory: breaking the symmetry between interaction and replacement.
about
Stable heterogeneity for the production of diffusible factors in cell populationsPopulation structure induces a symmetry breaking favoring the emergence of cooperationA conceptual cellular interaction model of left ventricular remodelling post-MI: dynamic network with exit-entry competition strategyEvolutionary dynamics in structured populationsMesoscopic effects in an agent-based bargaining model in regular lattices.Win-stay-lose-learn promotes cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game.Bipartite graphs as models of population structures in evolutionary multiplayer gamesAspiration dynamics in structured population acts as if in a well-mixed one.Cooperation in networks where the learning environment differs from the interaction environment.Diffusive public goods and coexistence of cooperators and cheaters on a 1D latticeAsymmetric Evolutionary GamesIntermediate-Range Migration Furnishes a Narrow Margin of Efficiency in the Two-Strategy Competition.Evolutionary Games of Multiplayer Cooperation on Graphs.Computational complexity of ecological and evolutionary spatial dynamics.Transforming the dilemma.Strategy selection in structured populations.Evolutionary consequences of behavioral diversity.Bribery games on inter-dependent regular networks.Biased imitation in coupled evolutionary games in interdependent networks.Evolutionary stability on graphs.The one-third law of evolutionary dynamicsFixation Probabilities for Any Configuration of Two Strategies on Regular GraphsRepeated games and direct reciprocity under active linking.Multi-player games on the cycleDynamics of growth factor production in monolayers of cancer cells and evolution of resistance to anticancer therapies.Cellular cooperation with shift updating and repulsion.Structural symmetry in evolutionary games.Degree mixing in multilayer networks impedes the evolution of cooperation.Effects of motion in structured populations.Local replicator dynamics: a simple link between deterministic and stochastic models of evolutionary game theory.Selection of noise level in strategy adoption for spatial social dilemmas.Cooperation enhanced by moderate tolerance ranges in myopically selective interactions.Effects of strategy-migration direction and noise in the evolutionary spatial prisoner's dilemma.Cooperation in spatial prisoner's dilemma with two types of players for increasing number of neighbors.Interaction stochasticity supports cooperation in spatial Prisoner's dilemma.Inclusive fitness analysis on mathematical groups.Stochastic gain in finite populations.Impact of fraud on the mean-field dynamics of cooperative social systems.Coevolution of Cooperation, Response to Adverse Social Ties and Network StructureFixation Probabilities on Complete Star and Bipartite Digraphs
P2860
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P2860
Evolutionary graph theory: breaking the symmetry between interaction and replacement.
description
2007 nî lūn-bûn
@nan
2007年の論文
@ja
2007年論文
@yue
2007年論文
@zh-hant
2007年論文
@zh-hk
2007年論文
@zh-mo
2007年論文
@zh-tw
2007年论文
@wuu
2007年论文
@zh
2007年论文
@zh-cn
name
Evolutionary graph theory: breaking the symmetry between interaction and replacement.
@ast
Evolutionary graph theory: breaking the symmetry between interaction and replacement.
@en
type
label
Evolutionary graph theory: breaking the symmetry between interaction and replacement.
@ast
Evolutionary graph theory: breaking the symmetry between interaction and replacement.
@en
prefLabel
Evolutionary graph theory: breaking the symmetry between interaction and replacement.
@ast
Evolutionary graph theory: breaking the symmetry between interaction and replacement.
@en
P2860
P1476
Evolutionary graph theory: breaking the symmetry between interaction and replacement
@en
P2093
Hisashi Ohtsuki
Martin A Nowak
P2860
P304
P356
10.1016/J.JTBI.2007.01.024
P407
P577
2007-02-08T00:00:00Z