Evolution of extortion in Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma games.
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Group Size Effect on Cooperation in One-Shot Social Dilemmas II: Curvilinear EffectThe extended phenotypes of marine symbioses: ecological and evolutionary consequences of intraspecific genetic diversity in coral-algal associations.Humans choose representatives who enforce cooperation in social dilemmas through extortionDefection and extortion as unexpected catalysts of unconditional cooperation in structured populationsCooperation and control in multiplayer social dilemmasCollapse of cooperation in evolving gamesConformity enhances network reciprocity in evolutionary social dilemmas.Adaptive dynamics of extortion and compliance.The shift between the Red Queen and the Red King effects in mutualisms.Forgiver triumphs in alternating Prisoner's Dilemma.Plant defense phenotypes determine the consequences of volatile emission for individuals and neighborsRelational diversity promotes cooperation in prisoner's dilemma games.Dependency links can hinder the evolution of cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game on lattices and networks.The art of war: beyond memory-one strategies in population gamesOn Nash Equilibrium and Evolutionarily Stable States That Are Not Characterised by the Folk Theorem.Evolution of Conformity in Social DilemmasZero-Determinant Strategies in Iterated Public Goods Game.Asymmetric Power Boosts Extortion in an Economic Experiment.The Emergence of Relationship-based Cooperation.Leaders should not be conformists in evolutionary social dilemmasAutocratic strategies for iterated games with arbitrary action spacesExtortion can outperform generosity in the iterated prisoner's dilemmaComparing reactive and memory-one strategies of direct reciprocity.From extortion to generosity, evolution in the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma.Evolutionary consequences of behavioral diversity.An oscillating tragedy of the commons in replicator dynamics with game-environment feedback.Extortion provides alternative routes to the evolution of cooperation in structured populations.Evolutionary performance of zero-determinant strategies in multiplayer games.Extortion subdues human players but is finally punished in the prisoner's dilemmaExtortion under uncertainty: Zero-determinant strategies in noisy games.Partners or rivals? Strategies for the iterated prisoner's dilemmaSmall groups and long memories promote cooperation.Memory-n strategies of direct reciprocity.The Red Queen and King in finite populations.Stags, Hawks, and Doves: Social Evolution Theory and Individual Variation in Cooperation.Invasion of Cooperation in Scale-Free Networks: Accumulated versus Average Payoffs.Aspiration promotes cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game with the imitation rule.Evolution of cooperation in a particular case of the infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma with three strategies.Nash equilibrium and evolutionary dynamics in semifinalists' dilemma.Different perceptions of social dilemmas: evolutionary multigames in structured populations.
P2860
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P2860
Evolution of extortion in Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma games.
description
2013 nî lūn-bûn
@nan
2013年の論文
@ja
2013年論文
@yue
2013年論文
@zh-hant
2013年論文
@zh-hk
2013年論文
@zh-mo
2013年論文
@zh-tw
2013年论文
@wuu
2013年论文
@zh
2013年论文
@zh-cn
name
Evolution of extortion in Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma games.
@en
type
label
Evolution of extortion in Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma games.
@en
prefLabel
Evolution of extortion in Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma games.
@en
P2860
P356
P1476
Evolution of extortion in Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma games
@en
P2093
Karl Sigmund
Martin A Nowak
P2860
P304
P356
10.1073/PNAS.1214834110
P407
P577
2013-04-09T00:00:00Z