Using Behavioral Economics to Design Physician Incentives That Deliver High-Value Care.
about
Disparate British Breast Reconstruction Utilization: Is Universal Coverage Sufficient to Ensure Expanded Care?ACOs Holding Commercial Contracts Are Larger And More Efficient Than Noncommercial ACOs.Herding: a new phenomenon affecting medical decision-making in multiple sclerosis care? Lessons learned from DIScUTIR MSDecision-making in Multiple Sclerosis: The Role of Aversion to Ambiguity for Therapeutic Inertia among Neurologists (DIScUTIR MS).Ethics and high-value care.Effectiveness of a financial incentive to physicians for timely follow-up after hospital discharge: a population-based time series analysis.Clinician-Level Predictors for Ordering Low-Value Imaging.Initiative to reduce bone scans for low-risk prostate cancer patients: A quasi-experimental before-and-after study in a Veterans Affairs hospital.More Than Money: Motivating Physician Behavior Change in Accountable Care Organizations.Feasibility and acceptability of two incentive-based implementation strategies for mental health therapists implementing cognitive-behavioral therapy: a pilot study to inform a randomized controlled trial.Ethical Issues in the Design and Implementation of Population Health Programs.Barriers and facilitators to orthopaedic surgeons' uptake of decision aids for total knee arthroplasty: a qualitative study.Changing Intensivists' Behaviors: A Challenge in Need of New Solutions.Financial incentives for physicians to improve health care.Can Appealing to Patient Altruism Reduce Overuse of Health Care Services? An Experimental Survey.Financial Penalties for Performance in Health Care.The Role of Prescribing Generic (Non-proprietary) Drugs in the Prevalence of Therapeutic Inertia in Multiple Sclerosis Care
P2860
Q37116997-2FBC0546-141B-41C1-A4FF-622C29481E78Q37425384-262F97D0-9EA6-4908-BBF8-D5322CE99007Q37626730-1CAA4777-321C-478D-B97D-6CDB17E97921Q37672368-9A9871B0-67F4-4880-869A-BE7A4C3CEBC4Q41077574-4C693C00-700C-4C6C-8C3F-8E6F924B7E02Q42232790-24D70D63-EAA0-4971-865A-CE7A874A4C52Q42694734-0BDC408B-CA9E-43D0-950A-7A1BCEC8CF4BQ43379669-DC181215-473D-4CAE-B8DC-FFFC289FD100Q46533225-2F6B56DC-AC11-4B17-85E7-692EBE2FD297Q47143711-E687D043-8539-4A33-BBCB-337A6D4AE999Q47572683-7D38AD43-1CF5-4EC1-9ABC-EB6690541934Q47615802-138361B2-EC8A-467A-85D8-6D8A3242AFE9Q48194796-42927080-90CF-4AAA-A65E-44D4FE399B23Q49921042-64469EA8-BA56-4F07-8AC6-4807AAB333C7Q51330762-9DC9A1FA-C441-4DF0-B643-9EC56A04BD92Q54441496-873D1A43-BA35-49E6-8F48-7CE34DFAD5A6Q58122615-6B9340F9-D9A7-4F0F-9F49-BFFD202EDC72
P2860
Using Behavioral Economics to Design Physician Incentives That Deliver High-Value Care.
description
2015 nî lūn-bûn
@nan
2015年の論文
@ja
2015年論文
@yue
2015年論文
@zh-hant
2015年論文
@zh-hk
2015年論文
@zh-mo
2015年論文
@zh-tw
2015年论文
@wuu
2015年论文
@zh
2015年论文
@zh-cn
name
Using Behavioral Economics to Design Physician Incentives That Deliver High-Value Care.
@en
type
label
Using Behavioral Economics to Design Physician Incentives That Deliver High-Value Care.
@en
prefLabel
Using Behavioral Economics to Design Physician Incentives That Deliver High-Value Care.
@en
P2093
P356
P1476
Using Behavioral Economics to Design Physician Incentives That Deliver High-Value Care
@en
P2093
Aditi P Sen
Amol S Navathe
Gregg Meyer
Judd B Kessler
Meredith B Rosenthal
Pankaj Patel
Paul Sherman
Peter A Ubel
Ralph W Muller
P304
P356
10.7326/M15-1330
P407
P577
2015-11-24T00:00:00Z