The Evolution of Cooperation Through Institutional Incentives and Optional Participation.

about

First carrot, then stick: how the adaptive hybridization of incentives promotes cooperation.Optimal distribution of incentives for public cooperation in heterogeneous interaction environments.When is bigger better? The effects of group size on the evolution of helping behaviours.

P2860

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P2860

The Evolution of Cooperation Through Institutional Incentives and Optional Participation.

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http://www.wikidata.org/entity/Q39614207

description

2013 nî lūn-bûn

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2013年の論文

@ja

2013年論文

@yue

2013年論文

@zh-hant

2013年論文

@zh-hk

2013年論文

@zh-mo

2013年論文

@zh-tw

2013年论文

@wuu

2013年论文

@zh

2013年论文

@zh-cn

name

The Evolution of Cooperation Through Institutional Incentives and Optional Participation.

@en

The Evolution of Cooperation Through Institutional Incentives and Optional Participation.

@nl

type

Item

label

The Evolution of Cooperation Through Institutional Incentives and Optional Participation.

@en

The Evolution of Cooperation Through Institutional Incentives and Optional Participation.

@nl

prefLabel

The Evolution of Cooperation Through Institutional Incentives and Optional Participation.

@en

The Evolution of Cooperation Through Institutional Incentives and Optional Participation.

@nl

P1476

The Evolution of Cooperation Through Institutional Incentives and Optional Participation

@en

P2093

Tatsuya Sasaki

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P2860

Altruistic punishment and the origin of cooperation

The Tragedy of the Commons

The tragedy of the commons. The population problem has no technical solution; it requires a fundamental extension in morality

Positive interactions promote public cooperation.

Reward and punishment

Coordinated punishment of defectors sustains cooperation and can proliferate when rare.

Punishing and abstaining for public goods.

The competitive advantage of sanctioning institutions.

Via freedom to coercion: the emergence of costly punishment.

Centralized sanctioning and legitimate authority promote cooperation in humans.

P2888

s13235-013-0094-7

P304

345-362

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P31

scholarly article

P356

10.1007/S13235-013-0094-7

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P478

http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string

P50

Tatsuya Sasaki

P577

2013-08-17T00:00:00Z

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P5875

255961632

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P698

27069751

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P818

1302.6742

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P932

4811019

http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string

The Evolution of Cooperation Through Institutional Incentives and Optional Participation.

about

P2860

P2860

The Evolution of Cooperation Through Institutional Incentives and Optional Participation.

description

name

type

label

prefLabel

P1433

P1476

P2093

P2860

P2888

P304

P31

P356

P478

P50

P577

P5875

P698

P818

P932

P356

P1433

P1476

P2093

P2860

P2888

P304

P31

P356

P478

P50

P577

P5875

P698

P818

P932