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Game Theory Meets Wireless Sensor Networks Security Requirements and Threats Mitigation: A Survey.Eco-evolutionary feedback and the invasion of cooperation in prisoner's dilemma gamesHigh cost enhances cooperation through the interplay between evolution and self-organisation.Upstream reciprocity and the evolution of gratitudeBeneficial laggards: multilevel selection, cooperative polymorphism and division of labour in threshold public good games.Reciprocity, culture and human cooperation: previous insights and a new cross-cultural experimentSpecialization and evolutionary branching within migratory populations.Public goods dilemma in asexual ant societiesOnymity promotes cooperation in social dilemma experiments.Detecting the molecular signature of social conflict: theory and a test with bacterial quorum sensing genes.Evolutionary stability in the asymmetric volunteer's dilemma.Adaptive evolution of cooperation through Darwinian dynamics in Public Goods gamesEvolutionary causes and consequences of consistent individual variation in cooperative behaviour.The evolution of cell-to-cell communication in a sporulating bacterium.Collapse of cooperation in evolving gamesEvolutionary history predicts the stability of cooperation in microbial communities.A slowly evolving host moves first in symbiotic interactionsAn application of evolutionary game theory to social dilemmas: the traveler's dilemma and the minimum effort coordination gameSpatial population expansion promotes the evolution of cooperation in an experimental Prisoner's Dilemma.Why mutual helping in most natural systems is neither conflict-free nor based on maximal conflictWhere Two Are Fighting, the Third Wins: Stronger Selection Facilitates Greater Polymorphism in Traits Conferring Competition-Dispersal Tradeoffs.Evolution of Cooperation in Social Dilemmas on Complex Networks.Genomic signatures of cooperation and conflict in the social amoeba.Collective action problem in heterogeneous groups.Models of social evolution: can we do better to predict 'who helps whom to achieve what'?Autocratic strategies for iterated games with arbitrary action spacesSynergy and group size in microbial cooperation.A tale of two contribution mechanisms for nonlinear public goods.Divergent investment strategies of Acacia myrmecophytes and the coexistence of mutualists and exploiters.Evolutionary consequences of behavioral diversity.A theory for the evolution of other-regard integrating proximate and ultimate perspectives.Use of game-theoretical methods in biochemistry and biophysics.Evolutionary dynamics of nitrogen fixation in the legume-rhizobia symbiosisAspiration dynamics of multi-player games in finite populations.Cooperation and the evolutionary ecology of bacterial virulence: the Bacillus cereus group as a novel study system.Selfishness and altruism can coexist when help is subject to diminishing returns.Reputation can enhance or suppress cooperation through positive feedback.Evolutionary game dynamics with non-uniform interaction rates.Cheating is evolutionarily assimilated with cooperation in the continuous snowdrift game.Antisocial rewarding in structured populations.
P2860
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P2860
description
2004 nî lūn-bûn
@nan
2004年の論文
@ja
2004年学术文章
@wuu
2004年学术文章
@zh
2004年学术文章
@zh-cn
2004年学术文章
@zh-hans
2004年学术文章
@zh-my
2004年学术文章
@zh-sg
2004年學術文章
@yue
2004年學術文章
@zh-hant
name
The evolutionary origin of cooperators and defectors.
@en
The evolutionary origin of cooperators and defectors.
@nl
type
label
The evolutionary origin of cooperators and defectors.
@en
The evolutionary origin of cooperators and defectors.
@nl
prefLabel
The evolutionary origin of cooperators and defectors.
@en
The evolutionary origin of cooperators and defectors.
@nl
P356
P1433
P1476
The evolutionary origin of cooperators and defectors.
@en
P2093
Michael Doebeli
Timothy Killingback
P304
P356
10.1126/SCIENCE.1101456
P407
P577
2004-10-01T00:00:00Z