about
Imitation dynamics of vaccination behaviour on social networksEvolution of global cooperation driven by risks.Different reactions to adverse neighborhoods in games of cooperation.The coevolution of overconfidence and bluffing in the resource competition game.Evolution of cooperation on stochastic dynamical networks.Evolutionary dynamics of N-person Hawk-Dove gamesImperfect vaccine aggravates the long-standing dilemma of voluntary vaccinationEvolution of interactions and cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game.Moving away from nasty encounters enhances cooperation in ecological prisoner's dilemma game.Evolutionary dynamics on stochastic evolving networks for multiple-strategy games.Win-stay-lose-learn promotes cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game.Evolution of cooperation driven by reputation-based migration.Reputation-based conditional interaction supports cooperation in well-mixed prisoner's dilemmas.Adaptive and bounded investment returns promote cooperation in spatial public goods games.The increased risk of joint venture promotes social cooperation.Aspiration dynamics in structured population acts as if in a well-mixed one.Aspiration-based partner switching boosts cooperation in social dilemmasCoevolutionary dynamics of phenotypic diversity and contingent cooperation.Cooperation in group-structured populations with two layers of interactions.Adaptive role switching promotes fairness in networked ultimatum game.Reputation-based partner choice promotes cooperation in social networks.Aspiration dynamics of multi-player games in finite populations.Bluffing promotes overconfidence on social networksInterpretations arising from Wrightian and Malthusian fitness under strong frequency dependent selection.Cooperation with both synergistic and local interactions can be worse than each alone.Individual mobility promotes punishment in evolutionary public goods games.Inertia in strategy switching transforms the strategy evolution.Effects of adaptive dynamical linking in networked games.Partner selections in public goods games with constant group size.Coevolution of nonlinear group interactions and strategies in well-mixed and structured populations.Voluntary vaccination dilemma with evolving psychological perceptions.The fundamental advantages of temporal networks.Conditional punishment is a double-edged sword in promoting cooperation.Speed of evolution on graphs.Promotion of cooperation induced by appropriate payoff aspirations in a small-world networked game.Consensus of Multiagent Systems With Distance-Dependent Communication Networks.Adaptive tag switching reinforces the coevolution of contingent cooperation and tag diversity.Evolution of cooperation with interactive identity and diversity.Impact of generalized benefit functions on the evolution of cooperation in spatial public goods games with continuous strategies.Promote or hinder? The role of punishment in the emergence of cooperation.
P50
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P50
description
onderzoeker
@nl
researcher
@en
հետազոտող
@hy
name
Long Wang
@ast
Long Wang
@en
Long Wang
@es
Long Wang
@nl
Long Wang
@sl
type
label
Long Wang
@ast
Long Wang
@en
Long Wang
@es
Long Wang
@nl
Long Wang
@sl
prefLabel
Long Wang
@ast
Long Wang
@en
Long Wang
@es
Long Wang
@nl
Long Wang
@sl
P214
P106
P214
P2456
P31
P496
0000-0001-5600-8157
P7859
viaf-102494824