Antisocial pool rewarding does not deter public cooperation. - Wikidata - wikimedia - TriplyDB

Antisocial pool rewarding does not deter public cooperation.

Antisocial pool rewarding does not deter public cooperation.

http://www.wikidata.org/entity/Q51076642

about

Competitions between prosocial exclusions and punishments in finite populations.When agreement-accepting free-riders are a necessary evil for the evolution of cooperation Evolution of conditional cooperation under multilevel selection The dynamics of human behavior in the public goods game with institutional incentives Increasing returns to scale: The solution to the second-order social dilemma.Impact of Social Reward on the Evolution of the Cooperation Behavior in Complex Networks.Bribery games on inter-dependent regular networks.Antisocial rewarding in structured populations.Risk-aware multi-armed bandit problem with application to portfolio selection.Coevolution of Vertex Weights Resolves Social Dilemma in Spatial Networks.An optimal strategy to solve the Prisoner's Dilemma.Alliance formation with exclusion in the spatial public goods game.Cooperation enhanced by the coevolution of teaching activity in evolutionary prisoner's dilemma games with voluntary participation.Culture and cooperation in a spatial public goods game.Extension of a spatial evolutionary coordination game with neutral options.

P2860

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P2860

Antisocial pool rewarding does not deter public cooperation.

http://www.wikidata.org/entity/Q51076642

description

2015 nî lūn-bûn

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2015年の論文

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2015年学术文章

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2015年学术文章

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2015年学术文章

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2015年学术文章

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2015年学术文章

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2015年学术文章

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2015年學術文章

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2015年學術文章

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name

Antisocial pool rewarding does not deter public cooperation.

@en

Antisocial pool rewarding does not deter public cooperation.

@nl

type

label

Antisocial pool rewarding does not deter public cooperation.

@en

Antisocial pool rewarding does not deter public cooperation.

@nl

prefLabel

Antisocial pool rewarding does not deter public cooperation.

@en

Antisocial pool rewarding does not deter public cooperation.

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Proceedings of the Royal Society B

P1476

Antisocial pool rewarding does not deter public cooperation.

@en

P2860

Five rules for the evolution of cooperation

Punishment and cooperation in nature

Evolutionary establishment of moral and double moral standards through spatial interactions

The Tragedy of the Commons

The tragedy of the commons. The population problem has no technical solution; it requires a fundamental extension in morality

Social networks and cooperation in hunter-gatherers

Asymmetric interaction paired with a super-rational strategy might resolve the tragedy of the commons without requiring recognition or negotiation

Climate change governance, cooperation and self-organization.

Local dispersal promotes biodiversity in a real-life game of rock-paper-scissors.

To qualify as a social partner, humans hide severe punishment, although their observed cooperativeness is decisive

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20151975

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10.1098/RSPB.2015.1975

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1816

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282

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Attila Szolnoki

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