The excuse principle can maintain cooperation through forgivable defection in the Prisoner's Dilemma game.
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The concepts of asymmetric and symmetric power can help resolve the puzzle of altruistic and cooperative behaviour.On Nash Equilibrium and Evolutionarily Stable States That Are Not Characterised by the Folk Theorem.Correlated pay-offs are key to cooperationSmall-scale societies exhibit fundamental variation in the role of intentions in moral judgmentSocial benefits of non-kin food sharing by female vampire bats.
P2860
The excuse principle can maintain cooperation through forgivable defection in the Prisoner's Dilemma game.
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2013 nî lūn-bûn
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The excuse principle can maint ...... n the Prisoner's Dilemma game.
@en
The excuse principle can maint ...... n the Prisoner's Dilemma game.
@nl
type
label
The excuse principle can maint ...... n the Prisoner's Dilemma game.
@en
The excuse principle can maint ...... n the Prisoner's Dilemma game.
@nl
prefLabel
The excuse principle can maint ...... n the Prisoner's Dilemma game.
@en
The excuse principle can maint ...... n the Prisoner's Dilemma game.
@nl
P2093
P2860
P356
P1476
The excuse principle can maint ...... n the Prisoner's Dilemma game.
@en
P2093
Hanna Kokko
Indrikis Krams
Jolanta Vrublevska
Markus J Rantala
Mikus Abolins-Abols
Tatjana Krama
P2860
P304
P356
10.1098/RSPB.2013.1475
P577
2013-07-17T00:00:00Z