Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
about
Voting systems for environmental decisionsChaos, but in voting and apportionments?A Mechanism for Fair Distribution of Resources without Payments.On the likelihood of single-peaked preferences.Can a Circular Payment Card Format Effectively Elicit Preferences? Evidence From a Survey on a Mandatory Health Insurance Scheme in Tunisia.The Relationship Between the Normalized Gradient Addition Mechanism and Quadratic Voting.A social diffusion model with an application on election simulation.Electing Popes: Approval Balloting and Qualified-Majority RuleThe Problem of Strategic Behavior under Approval VotingA Conditional Defense of Plurality Rule: Generalizing May's Theorem in a Restricted Informational EnvironmentCondorcet’s principle and the strong no-show paradoxesThe Borda Count and its real-world alternatives: Comparing scoring rules in Nauru and SloveniaAgency and structure: Interpreting power relationshipsWhy optimality is not worth arguing aboutScope sensitivity in households' willingness to pay for maintained and improved water supplies in a developing world urban area: Investigating the influence of baseline supply quality and income distribution upon stated preferences in Mexico CityHopeful Losers? A Moral Case for Mixed Electoral SystemsA new approach to measure tactical voting: evidence from the British electionsAn individual manipulability of positional voting rules
P2860
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P2860
Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
description
im April 1975 veröffentlichter wissenschaftlicher Artikel
@de
wetenschappelijk artikel
@nl
наукова стаття, опублікована у квітні 1975
@uk
name
Strategy-proofness and Arrow's ...... s and social welfare functions
@en
Strategy-proofness and Arrow's ...... s and social welfare functions
@nl
type
label
Strategy-proofness and Arrow's ...... s and social welfare functions
@en
Strategy-proofness and Arrow's ...... s and social welfare functions
@nl
prefLabel
Strategy-proofness and Arrow's ...... s and social welfare functions
@en
Strategy-proofness and Arrow's ...... s and social welfare functions
@nl
P1476
Strategy-proofness and Arrow's ...... s and social welfare functions
@en
P2093
Mark Allen Satterthwaite
P304
P356
10.1016/0022-0531(75)90050-2
P577
1975-04-01T00:00:00Z