Extensional versus intuitive reasoning: The conjunction fallacy in probability judgment
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Assessment of cognitive biases and biostatistics knowledge of medical residents: a multicenter, cross-sectional questionnaire studyA theory of medical decision making and health: fuzzy trace theoryComprehension and computation in Bayesian problem solvingMeasuring Individual Differences in Decision Biases: Methodological Considerations.Good fences make for good neighbors but bad science: a review of what improves Bayesian reasoning and whyQuantum-Like Bayesian Networks for Modeling Decision MakingDifferent neural systems contribute to semantic bias and conflict detection in the inclusion fallacy taskHow to Make Cognitive Illusions Disappear: Beyond “Heuristics and Biases”The Evolution of Cognitive BiasToward a Better Understanding of the Relationship between Belief in the Paranormal and Statistical Bias: The Potential Role of Schizotypy.Talker-Specific Generalization of Pragmatic Inferences based on Under- and Over-Informative Prenominal Adjective Use.Costly Signaling Increases Trust, Even Across Religious Affiliations.How a cognitive psychologist came to seek universal laws.Unitary Transformations in the Quantum Model for Conceptual Conjunctions and Its Application to Data Representation.Are we too fixated on clinical trial data? The case for using embedded case histories to influence prescribing.Laypersons' understanding of relative risk reductions: randomised cross-sectional study.Biased but in doubt: conflict and decision confidence.Perceptions of document relevance.Reason and lessBase-rate respect: From ecological rationality to dual processes.Age differences in the use of beneficial and misleading cues in recall: with a comment on the measurement of between-group differences in accuracy.Is experiential-intuitive cognitive style more inclined to err on conjunction fallacy than analytical-rational cognitive style?Is expert opinion reliable when estimating transition probabilities? The case of HCV-related cirrhosis in Egypt.Everything is permitted? People intuitively judge immorality as representative of atheists.Personality, Cognitive Style, Motivation, and Aptitude Predict Systematic Trends in Analytic Forecasting BehaviorCognitive and Motivational Biases in Decision and Risk Analysis.The evolution and devolution of cognitive control: The costs of deliberation in a competitive world.The Dilution Effect and Information Integration in Perceptual Decision Making.The framing effect and skin conductance responsesApproaches to Foster Transfer of Formal Principles: Which Route to Take?The Immoral Landscape? Scientists Are Associated with Violations of Morality.Security of attachment to spouses in late life: Concurrent and prospective links with cognitive and emotional wellbeingAn evaluation of dual-process theories of reasoning.Rationality, perception, and the all-seeing eyeQuantum Decision Theory in Simple Risky Choices.The heuristic-analytic theory of reasoning: extension and evaluation.Woulda, coulda, shoulda: the evaluation and the impact of the alternative outcome.Individual Differences in Numeracy and Cognitive Reflection, with Implications for Biases and Fallacies in Probability JudgmentThe Conjunction and Disjunction Fallacies: Explanations of the Linda Problem by the Equate-to-Differentiate Model.A functional framework for the influence of implicit and explicit motives on autobiographical memory.
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Extensional versus intuitive reasoning: The conjunction fallacy in probability judgment
description
im Januar 1983 veröffentlichter wissenschaftlicher Artikel
@de
wetenschappelijk artikel
@nl
наукова стаття, опублікована в 1983
@uk
name
Extensional versus intuitive reasoning: The conjunction fallacy in probability judgment
@en
Extensional versus intuitive reasoning: The conjunction fallacy in probability judgment
@nl
type
label
Extensional versus intuitive reasoning: The conjunction fallacy in probability judgment
@en
Extensional versus intuitive reasoning: The conjunction fallacy in probability judgment
@nl
prefLabel
Extensional versus intuitive reasoning: The conjunction fallacy in probability judgment
@en
Extensional versus intuitive reasoning: The conjunction fallacy in probability judgment
@nl
P1433
P1476
Extensional versus intuitive reasoning: The conjunction fallacy in probability judgment
@en
P304
P356
10.1037/0033-295X.90.4.293
P577
1983-01-01T00:00:00Z