Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design
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What is the empirical basis for paying for quality in health care?What counts? An ethnographic study of infection data reported to a patient safety programImpact assessment of a pay-for-performance program on breast cancer screening in France using micro data.Selecting effective incentive structures in health care: A decision framework to support health care purchasers in finding the right incentives to drive performance.Has pay-for-performance decreased access for minority patients?Economic evaluation of pay-for-performance in health care: a systematic review.Medicaid bed-hold policy and Medicare skilled nursing facility rehospitalizations.An economic analysis of payment for health care services: the United States and Switzerland compared.Assessing the influence of incentives on physicians and medical groups.Key issues in the design of pay for performance programs.Hitting and missing targets by ambulance services for emergency calls: effects of different systems of performance measurement within the UK.Impact of public reporting on unreported quality of care.The economics of specialty hospitals.When incentives work too well: locally implemented pay for performance (P4P) and adverse sanctions towards home birth in Tanzania - a qualitative study.Managers' Compensation in a Mixed Ownership Industry: Evidence from Nursing Homes.The cost-effectiveness of using financial incentives to improve provider quality: a framework and application.Ranking games.Incentives and models of governance.Managerial Ownership in Nursing Homes: Staffing, Quality, and Financial Performance.Performance-based financing: the same is different.A Longitudinal Assessment of the Effect of Resident-Centered Care on Quality in Veterans Health Administration Community Living Centers.Performance-based financing in the heath sector in low- and middle-income countries: Is there anything whereof it may be said, see, this is new?Health system changes under pay-for-performance: the effects of Rwanda's national programme on facility inputs.Differential Effects of Declining Rates in a Per Diem Payment System.Link between pay for performance incentives and physician payment mechanisms: evidence from the diabetes management incentive in Ontario.Informal payments and health worker effort: a quantitative study from Tanzania.Pro-social preferences and self-selection into the public health sector: evidence from an economic experiment.Response to regulatory stringency: the case of antipsychotic medication use in nursing homes.Can you get what you pay for? Pay-for-performance and the quality of healthcare providers.Intended and unintended consequences of minimum staffing standards for nursing homes.Ordered Rape: A Principal-Agent Analysis of Wartime Sexual Violence in the DR Congo.Decentralization strategies and provider incentives in healthcare: evidence from the english national health service.Studying the link between institutions and health system performance: a framework and an illustration with the analysis of two performance-based financing schemes in Burundi.Pay scheme preferences and health policy objectives.Giving and Receiving Awards.Information asymmetry and performance tilting in hospitals: a national empirical study.A Note on the Comparative Statics of Pay-for-Performance in Health Care.The interaction between cost-management and learning for major surgical procedures - lessons from asymmetric information.Incentive Design and Quality Improvements: Evidence from State Medicaid Nursing Home Pay-for-Performance Programs.The Proper Scope of Government: Theory and an Application to Prisons
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P2860
Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design
description
wetenschappelijk artikel
@nl
наукова стаття, опублікована в січні 1991
@uk
name
Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design
@en
Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design
@nl
type
label
Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design
@en
Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design
@nl
prefLabel
Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design
@en
Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design
@nl
P1476
Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design
@en
P2093
B. Holmstrom
P. Milgrom
P356
10.1093/JLEO/7.SPECIAL_ISSUE.24
P433
P577
1991-01-01T00:00:00Z