TIT FOR TAT in sticklebacks and the evolution of cooperation.
about
Chapter 5 Insights for Behavioral Ecology from Behavioral SyndromesIndividual variation evades the prisoner's dilemma.Reputation, a universal currency for human social interactionsEvolution of indirect reciprocity by image scoringSocial deprivation affects cooperative predator inspection in a cichlid fish.Cooperation beyond the dyad: on simple models and a complex society.Chaos and the evolution of cooperationCoordinated vigilance provides evidence for direct reciprocity in coral reef fishesSocial eavesdropping and the evolution of conditional cooperation and cheating strategiesNeural basis of conditional cooperation.Public goods dilemma in asexual ant societiesThe concepts of asymmetric and symmetric power can help resolve the puzzle of altruistic and cooperative behaviour.Helpful female subordinate cichlids are more likely to reproduceCognitive and motivational requirements for the emergence of cooperation in a rat social game.Swarm intelligence inspired shills and the evolution of cooperationEvolutionary dynamics in structured populationsHeterogeneous aspirations promote cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game.A functional imaging study of cooperation in two-person reciprocal exchange.Evolutionary causes and consequences of consistent individual variation in cooperative behaviour.Variation and the response to variation as a basis for successful cooperationSpecial agents can promote cooperation in the populationAre shoals of minnow Phoxinus phoxinus formed by close kin?Prisoner's dilemma and the pigeon: Control by immediate consequences.Inferring reputation promotes the evolution of cooperation in spatial social dilemma gamesEvolutionary cheating in Escherichia coli stationary phase cultures.From fish to fashion: experimental and theoretical insights into the evolution of culture.The increased risk of joint venture promotes social cooperation.Adaptive dynamics of extortion and compliance.Forgiver triumphs in alternating Prisoner's Dilemma.Kin assortment in juvenile shoals in wild guppy populations.Spatial games and the maintenance of cooperation.Evolution of Conformity in Social DilemmasEvolution of Cooperation in Social Dilemmas on Complex Networks.Stochastic evolutionary dynamics resolve the Traveler's DilemmaGrooming reciprocation among female primates: a meta-analysis.Tit-for-tat or win-stay, lose-shift?Asymmetry in pay-off predicts how familiar individuals respond to one another.Comparing reactive and memory-one strategies of direct reciprocity.A tale of two contribution mechanisms for nonlinear public goods.Implications of multiple mating for offspring relatedness and shoaling behaviour in juvenile guppies.
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P2860
TIT FOR TAT in sticklebacks and the evolution of cooperation.
description
1987 nî lūn-bûn
@nan
1987 թուականի Յունուարին հրատարակուած գիտական յօդուած
@hyw
1987 թվականի հունվարին հրատարակված գիտական հոդված
@hy
1987年の論文
@ja
1987年論文
@yue
1987年論文
@zh-hant
1987年論文
@zh-hk
1987年論文
@zh-mo
1987年論文
@zh-tw
1987年论文
@wuu
name
TIT FOR TAT in sticklebacks and the evolution of cooperation.
@ast
TIT FOR TAT in sticklebacks and the evolution of cooperation.
@en
TIT FOR TAT in sticklebacks and the evolution of cooperation.
@nl
type
label
TIT FOR TAT in sticklebacks and the evolution of cooperation.
@ast
TIT FOR TAT in sticklebacks and the evolution of cooperation.
@en
TIT FOR TAT in sticklebacks and the evolution of cooperation.
@nl
prefLabel
TIT FOR TAT in sticklebacks and the evolution of cooperation.
@ast
TIT FOR TAT in sticklebacks and the evolution of cooperation.
@en
TIT FOR TAT in sticklebacks and the evolution of cooperation.
@nl
P356
P1433
P1476
TIT FOR TAT in sticklebacks and the evolution of cooperation.
@en
P2093
Milinski M
P2888
P304
P356
10.1038/325433A0
P407
P577
1987-01-01T00:00:00Z
P6179
1033297886