about
Defection and extortion as unexpected catalysts of unconditional cooperation in structured populationsCooperation and control in multiplayer social dilemmasCollapse of cooperation in evolving gamesThe art of war: beyond memory-one strategies in population gamesEvolution of Conformity in Social DilemmasZero-Determinant Strategies in Iterated Public Goods Game.Asymmetric Power Boosts Extortion in an Economic Experiment.Autocratic strategies for iterated games with arbitrary action spacesComparing reactive and memory-one strategies of direct reciprocity.Evolutionary consequences of behavioral diversity.Extortion provides alternative routes to the evolution of cooperation in structured populations.Evolutionary performance of zero-determinant strategies in multiplayer games.Extortion subdues human players but is finally punished in the prisoner's dilemmaExtortion under uncertainty: Zero-determinant strategies in noisy games.Cheating is evolutionarily assimilated with cooperation in the continuous snowdrift game.Partners or rivals? Strategies for the iterated prisoner's dilemmaSmall groups and long memories promote cooperation.Reinforcement learning produces dominant strategies for the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma.An Open Framework for the Reproducible Study of the Iterated Prisoner’s DilemmaSocial Closure and the Evolution of Cooperation via Indirect Reciprocity
P2860
Q33820180-77ECC1A6-6535-4B82-AAAB-E840DE9DE670Q34581205-CF9DA8CC-82AD-44A1-B98E-0EC5BD8071FCQ34708850-5413A097-9737-4338-86B2-82A5E709D1EDQ35585288-8AE7B230-534A-453A-AA78-2B881F7327E3Q35761086-53BCF8F4-F863-4829-BF6A-96EB8C9597B8Q35979313-9A42512D-6761-4751-B9BB-A2F45490AF34Q36152688-F0DF62EF-35DA-4EA9-81A0-AEF31B30F06FQ36770568-0FF9717B-E1D7-46D4-8124-510E36219D50Q36886368-13B097F4-1C6B-4948-9562-FAFE9510D122Q37417961-C7ECDDD5-C212-4DDA-8FBD-CFFC7F19D2DBQ38723966-E981EC81-DA07-4CB4-A421-3AF059E83689Q40469451-633479BD-602E-44EF-BEA3-F79AF4B262A1Q40470222-E5CDEE2D-28E6-48EB-84FC-301B5C7C8625Q40844852-E61925FD-5BF3-4AF1-9F54-E1BBB5AD1A5BQ40962553-FE989B8C-7C11-4BA5-969A-D51FD4C87622Q42180484-DC42EC83-5640-4BB6-A518-2CE44F28F777Q42748205-EE96670E-3718-49CF-857E-A7140F0187C0Q47280268-BC640919-072A-487E-B488-EBF3940A52D0Q57012835-A67729A7-0A48-4C93-A5C0-ADBFDF8EDEF8Q57665478-F3EF84D4-0534-4644-9F31-E5A387C929B0
P2860
description
2013 nî lūn-bûn
@nan
2013 թուականի Նոյեմբերին հրատարակուած գիտական յօդուած
@hyw
2013 թվականի նոյեմբերին հրատարակված գիտական հոդված
@hy
2013年の論文
@ja
2013年論文
@yue
2013年論文
@zh-hant
2013年論文
@zh-hk
2013年論文
@zh-mo
2013年論文
@zh-tw
2013年论文
@wuu
name
Adaptive dynamics of extortion and compliance.
@ast
Adaptive dynamics of extortion and compliance.
@en
type
label
Adaptive dynamics of extortion and compliance.
@ast
Adaptive dynamics of extortion and compliance.
@en
prefLabel
Adaptive dynamics of extortion and compliance.
@ast
Adaptive dynamics of extortion and compliance.
@en
P2860
P1433
P1476
Adaptive dynamics of extortion and compliance.
@en
P2093
Christian Hilbe
Martin A Nowak
P2860
P304
P356
10.1371/JOURNAL.PONE.0077886
P407
P577
2013-11-01T00:00:00Z