Extortion subdues human players but is finally punished in the prisoner's dilemma
about
Reputation, a universal currency for human social interactionsHumans choose representatives who enforce cooperation in social dilemmas through extortionIndividual Characteristics vs. Experience: An Experimental Study on Cooperation in Prisoner's DilemmaCooperation and control in multiplayer social dilemmasOptimal cooperation-trap strategies for the iterated rock-paper-scissors gameEvolution of Conformity in Social DilemmasZero-Determinant Strategies in Iterated Public Goods Game.Asymmetric Power Boosts Extortion in an Economic Experiment.Autocratic strategies for iterated games with arbitrary action spacesExtortion can outperform generosity in the iterated prisoner's dilemmaResilient cooperators stabilize long-run cooperation in the finitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemma.Impact of Social Reward on the Evolution of the Cooperation Behavior in Complex Networks.Extortion provides alternative routes to the evolution of cooperation in structured populations.Evolutionary performance of zero-determinant strategies in multiplayer games.Extortion under uncertainty: Zero-determinant strategies in noisy games.Partners or rivals? Strategies for the iterated prisoner's dilemmaSmall groups and long memories promote cooperation.Social Closure and the Evolution of Cooperation via Indirect ReciprocityEnvironment-based preference selection promotes cooperation in spatial prisoner's dilemma game
P2860
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P2860
Extortion subdues human players but is finally punished in the prisoner's dilemma
description
2014 nî lūn-bûn
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2014年の論文
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2014年学术文章
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2014年学术文章
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2014年学术文章
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2014年学术文章
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2014年学术文章
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2014年學術文章
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name
Extortion subdues human players but is finally punished in the prisoner's dilemma
@en
type
label
Extortion subdues human players but is finally punished in the prisoner's dilemma
@en
prefLabel
Extortion subdues human players but is finally punished in the prisoner's dilemma
@en
P2093
P2860
P356
P1476
Extortion subdues human players but is finally punished in the prisoner's dilemma.
@en
P2093
Christian Hilbe
Manfred Milinski
Torsten Röhl
P2860
P2888
P356
10.1038/NCOMMS4976
P407
P577
2014-05-29T00:00:00Z