MORAL HAZARD IN HEALTH INSURANCE: DO DYNAMIC INCENTIVES MATTER?
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Health care demand elasticities by type of service.Myopic and Forward Looking Behavior in Branded Oral Anti-Diabetic Medication Consumption: An Example from Medicare Part D.Bunching at the kink: implications for spending responses to health insurance contracts.Private provision of social insurance: drug-specific price elasticities and cost sharing in Medicare Part D
P2860
MORAL HAZARD IN HEALTH INSURANCE: DO DYNAMIC INCENTIVES MATTER?
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2015 nî lūn-bûn
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2015年の論文
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2015年学术文章
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2015年学术文章
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2015年学术文章
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2015年学术文章
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2015年学术文章
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2015年學術文章
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MORAL HAZARD IN HEALTH INSURANCE: DO DYNAMIC INCENTIVES MATTER?
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MORAL HAZARD IN HEALTH INSURANCE: DO DYNAMIC INCENTIVES MATTER?
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type
label
MORAL HAZARD IN HEALTH INSURANCE: DO DYNAMIC INCENTIVES MATTER?
@ast
MORAL HAZARD IN HEALTH INSURANCE: DO DYNAMIC INCENTIVES MATTER?
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MORAL HAZARD IN HEALTH INSURANCE: DO DYNAMIC INCENTIVES MATTER?
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MORAL HAZARD IN HEALTH INSURANCE: DO DYNAMIC INCENTIVES MATTER?
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P2093
P2860
P356
P1476
MORAL HAZARD IN HEALTH INSURANCE: DO DYNAMIC INCENTIVES MATTER?
@en
P2093
Aviva Aron-Dine
Liran Einav
Mark Cullen
P2860
P304
P356
10.1162/REST_A_00518
P577
2015-10-01T00:00:00Z