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Estimating the Tradeoff Between Risk Protection and Moral Hazard with a Nonlinear Budget Set Model of Health Insurance.Is This Time Different? The Slowdown in Health Care Spending.Healthcare Coinsurance Elasticity Coefficient Estimation Using Monthly Cross-sectional, Time-series Claims Data.Comparison of Chinese inpatients with different types of medical insurance before and after the 2009 healthcare reformShould Governments engage health insurance intermediaries? A comparison of benefits with and without insurance intermediary in a large tax funded community health insurance scheme in the Indian state of Andhra Pradesh.MORAL HAZARD IN HEALTH INSURANCE: DO DYNAMIC INCENTIVES MATTER?Healthcare Demand in the Presence of Discrete Price Changes.Key Aspects of a Sustainable Health Insurance System in Germany.Does Health Insurance Encourage the Rise in Medical Prices? A Test on Balance Billing in France.The moral hazard effects of consumer responses to targeted cost-sharing.Measuring efficiency of health plan payment systems in managed competition health insurance markets.Health care demand elasticities by type of service.Myopic and Forward Looking Behavior in Branded Oral Anti-Diabetic Medication Consumption: An Example from Medicare Part D.Bunching at the kink: implications for spending responses to health insurance contracts.The Economic Consequences of Hospital Admissions.Beyond Statistics: The Economic Content of Risk Scores.Private provision of social insurance: drug-specific price elasticities and cost sharing in Medicare Part D
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P2860
description
article científic
@ca
article scientifique
@fr
articolo scientifico
@it
artigo científico
@pt
bilimsel makale
@tr
scientific article published on February 2013
@en
vedecký článok
@sk
vetenskaplig artikel
@sv
videnskabelig artikel
@da
vědecký článek
@cs
name
Selection on Moral Hazard in Health Insurance
@en
Selection on Moral Hazard in Health Insurance.
@nl
type
label
Selection on Moral Hazard in Health Insurance
@en
Selection on Moral Hazard in Health Insurance.
@nl
prefLabel
Selection on Moral Hazard in Health Insurance
@en
Selection on Moral Hazard in Health Insurance.
@nl
P2093
P2860
P356
P1476
Selection on Moral Hazard in Health Insurance
@en
P2093
Liran Einav
Mark R Cullen
Paul Schrimpf
Stephen Ryan
P2860
P304
P356
10.1257/AER.103.1.178
P577
2013-02-01T00:00:00Z