Intuition, deliberation, and the evolution of cooperation.
about
Potential follow-up increases private contributions to public goodsExposure to Hedione Increases Reciprocity in Humans.Registered Replication Report: Rand, Greene, and Nowak (2012)Response time in economic games reflects different types of decision conflict for prosocial and proself individualsCooperation, decision time, and culture: Online experiments with American and Indian participants.Leaders should not be conformists in evolutionary social dilemmasCortical thickness of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex predicts strategic choices in economic games.Rethinking spontaneous giving: Extreme time pressure and ego-depletion favor self-regarding reactions.Social Environment Shapes the Speed of Cooperation.Uncalculating cooperation is used to signal trustworthiness.Think global, act local: Preserving the global commons.Preferential interactions promote blind cooperation and informed defection.Emergence of communities and diversity in social networks.Deliberation favours social efficiency by making people disregard their relative shares: evidence from USA and India.Cooperation, Fast and Slow: Meta-Analytic Evidence for a Theory of Social Heuristics and Self-Interested Deliberation.Intuitive Participation in Aggressive Intergroup Conflict: Evidence of Weak Versus Strong Parochial Altruism.Evolution of flexibility and rigidity in retaliatory punishment.Reply to Myrseth and Wollbrant: Our model is consistent with altruism, and helps to explain its evolution.Models inconsistent with altruism cannot explain the evolution of human cooperation.A Dominant Social Comparison Heuristic Unites Alternative Mechanisms for the Evolution of Indirect Reciprocity.Does Short-Term Hunger Increase Trust and Trustworthiness in a High Trust Society?Cyclical population dynamics of automatic versus controlled processing: An evolutionary pendulum.Is intuition really cooperative? Improved tests support the social heuristics hypothesis.Sadism, the Intuitive System, and Antisocial Punishment in the Public Goods Game.Role-separating ordering in social dilemmas controlled by topological frustration.Manipulation of Pro-Sociality and Rule-Following with Non-invasive Brain Stimulation.Equal status in Ultimatum Games promotes rational sharing.From good institutions to generous citizens: Top-down incentives to cooperate promote subsequent prosociality but not norm enforcement.Stochastic win-stay-lose-shift strategy with dynamic aspirations in evolutionary social dilemmas.Crosstalk in concurrent repeated games impedes direct reciprocity and requires stronger levels of forgiveness.Third-party punishment as a costly signal of trustworthiness.Reflections on the Time-Pressure Cooperation Registered Replication Report.Social dilemma cooperation (unlike Dictator Game giving) is intuitive for men as well as women.Population Structure Promotes the Evolution of Intuitive Cooperation and Inhibits Deliberation.Evolution of Cooperation with Heterogeneous Conditional Cooperators.Preference and strategy in proposer's prosocial giving in the ultimatum game.Co-evolution of cooperation and cognition: the impact of imperfect deliberation and context-sensitive intuition.Uncertainty about social interactions leads to the evolution of social heuristics.Spillover modes in multiplex games: double-edged effects on cooperation and their coevolution.Examining Spillovers between Long and Short Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma Games Played in the Laboratory.
P2860
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P2860
Intuition, deliberation, and the evolution of cooperation.
description
2016 nî lūn-bûn
@nan
2016年の論文
@ja
2016年論文
@yue
2016年論文
@zh-hant
2016年論文
@zh-hk
2016年論文
@zh-mo
2016年論文
@zh-tw
2016年论文
@wuu
2016年论文
@zh
2016年论文
@zh-cn
name
Intuition, deliberation, and the evolution of cooperation.
@ast
Intuition, deliberation, and the evolution of cooperation.
@en
type
label
Intuition, deliberation, and the evolution of cooperation.
@ast
Intuition, deliberation, and the evolution of cooperation.
@en
prefLabel
Intuition, deliberation, and the evolution of cooperation.
@ast
Intuition, deliberation, and the evolution of cooperation.
@en
P2860
P356
P1476
Intuition, deliberation, and the evolution of cooperation
@en
P2093
P2860
P304
P356
10.1073/PNAS.1517780113
P407
P50
P577
2016-01-11T00:00:00Z