about
Decision-making in research tasks with sequential testingDynamic social networks promote cooperation in experiments with humansSystematic differences in impact across publication tracks at PNAS.Infectious disease modeling of social contagion in networks.Positive interactions promote public cooperation.Reflection does not undermine self-interested prosociality.Risking your life without a second thought: intuitive decision-making and extreme altruismHeuristics guide the implementation of social preferences in one-shot Prisoner's Dilemma experiments.Social heuristics shape intuitive cooperation.Inequality and visibility of wealth in experimental social networks.Static network structure can stabilize human cooperationTime pressure increases cooperation in competitively framed social dilemmas.Contagion of Cooperation in Static and Fluid Social Networks.The collective benefits of feeling good and letting go: positive emotion and (dis)inhibition interact to predict cooperative behavior.The evolution and devolution of cognitive control: The costs of deliberation in a competitive world.The evolution of antisocial punishment in optional public goods gamesAnti-social punishment can prevent the co-evolution of punishment and cooperationStochastic evolutionary dynamics resolve the Traveler's DilemmaOpposing Oxytocin Effects on Intergroup Cooperative Behavior in Intuitive and Reflective MindsDirect reciprocity in structured populationsWinners don't punish.Intuition, deliberation, and the evolution of cooperation.Social Environment Shapes the Speed of Cooperation.Uncalculating cooperation is used to signal trustworthiness.Cooperation, Fast and Slow: Meta-Analytic Evidence for a Theory of Social Heuristics and Self-Interested Deliberation.Cooperating with the future.Reply to Myrseth and Wollbrant: Our model is consistent with altruism, and helps to explain its evolution.Direct reciprocity with costly punishment: generous tit-for-tat prevails.Retaliation and antisocial punishment are overlooked in many theoretical models as well as behavioral experiments.Crosstalk in concurrent repeated games impedes direct reciprocity and requires stronger levels of forgiveness.Third-party punishment as a costly signal of trustworthiness.Evolutionary game dynamics of controlled and automatic decision-making.Humans display a 'cooperative phenotype' that is domain general and temporally stable.Punishment does not promote cooperation under exploration dynamics when anti-social punishment is possible.Divine intuition: cognitive style influences belief in God.Emotions as infectious diseases in a large social network: the SISa model.Computationally efficient strategy for modeling the effect of ion current modifiers.Population Structure Promotes the Evolution of Intuitive Cooperation and Inhibits Deliberation.Indirect Reciprocity and the Evolution of Prejudicial GroupsSpontaneous giving and calculated greed
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David G Rand
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David G Rand
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David G Rand
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David Rand
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David G Rand
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David G Rand
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David G Rand
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David Rand
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David G Rand
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David G Rand
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David G Rand
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David Rand
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