about
Evolutionary establishment of moral and double moral standards through spatial interactionsThe power of games: comment on "climate change governance, cooperation and self-organization" by Pacheco, Vasconcelos and Santos.Defection and extortion as unexpected catalysts of unconditional cooperation in structured populationsCyclic dominance in evolutionary games: a review.If cooperation is likely punish mildly: insights from economic experiments based on the snowdrift gameConformity enhances network reciprocity in evolutionary social dilemmas.From pairwise to group interactions in games of cyclic dominance.Congestion phenomena caused by matching pennies in evolutionary games.A double-edged sword: Benefits and pitfalls of heterogeneous punishment in evolutionary inspection games.Stability of cooperation under image scoring in group interactionsIf players are sparse social dilemmas are too: Importance of percolation for evolution of cooperation.Interdependent network reciprocity in evolutionary gamesEvolutionary dynamics of group interactions on structured populations: a review.Coevolutionary games--a mini review.Coexistence of fraternity and egoism for spatial social dilemmas.Percolation threshold determines the optimal population density for public cooperation.Evolution of emotions on networks leads to the evolution of cooperation in social dilemmas.Conditional strategies and the evolution of cooperation in spatial public goods games.Impact of critical mass on the evolution of cooperation in spatial public goods games.Group-size effects on the evolution of cooperation in the spatial public goods game.Different perceptions of social dilemmas: evolutionary multigames in structured populations.Facilitators on networks reveal optimal interplay between information exchange and reciprocity.Evolution of extortion in structured populations.Effectiveness of conditional punishment for the evolution of public cooperation.Rewarding evolutionary fitness with links between populations promotes cooperation.Risk-driven migration and the collective-risk social dilemma.Impact of generalized benefit functions on the evolution of cooperation in spatial public goods games with continuous strategies.Competition and cooperation among different punishing strategies in the spatial public goods game.Selfishness, fraternity, and other-regarding preference in spatial evolutionary games.Dynamically generated cyclic dominance in spatial prisoner's dilemma games.Selection of noise level in strategy adoption for spatial social dilemmas.Phase diagrams for three-strategy evolutionary prisoner's dilemma games on regular graphs.Impact of aging on the evolution of cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game.Cooperation in spatial prisoner's dilemma with two types of players for increasing number of neighbors.Restricted connections among distinguished players support cooperation.Benefits of tolerance in public goods games.Evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game on Newman-Watts networks.Social diversity and promotion of cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game.Cooperation in the noisy case: Prisoner's dilemma game on two types of regular random graphs.Phase diagrams for an evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game on two-dimensional lattices.
P50
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P50
description
(1966–) magyar fizikus
@hu
Hongaars onderzoeker
@nl
hulumtues
@sq
researcher
@en
ricercatore
@it
taighdeoir
@ga
հետազոտող
@hy
name
Attila Szolnoki
@ast
Attila Szolnoki
@en
Attila Szolnoki
@es
Attila Szolnoki
@ga
Attila Szolnoki
@nl
Attila Szolnoki
@sl
Attila Szolnoki
@sq
Szolnoki Attila
@hu
type
label
Attila Szolnoki
@ast
Attila Szolnoki
@en
Attila Szolnoki
@es
Attila Szolnoki
@ga
Attila Szolnoki
@nl
Attila Szolnoki
@sl
Attila Szolnoki
@sq
Szolnoki Attila
@hu
prefLabel
Attila Szolnoki
@ast
Attila Szolnoki
@en
Attila Szolnoki
@es
Attila Szolnoki
@ga
Attila Szolnoki
@nl
Attila Szolnoki
@sl
Attila Szolnoki
@sq
Szolnoki Attila
@hu
P1280
P1556
szolnoki.attila
P19
P21
P214
1318154441723835460000
P27
P31
P3226
P496
0000-0002-0907-0406
P569
1966-12-26T00:00:00Z
P6556
P735
P7859
viaf-1318154441723835460000