If players are sparse social dilemmas are too: Importance of percolation for evolution of cooperation.
about
Collective chasing behavior between cooperators and defectors in the spatial prisoner's dilemmaNodes having a major influence to break cooperation define a novel centrality measure: game centrality.Punishment based on public benefit fund significantly promotes cooperationAsymmetric interaction paired with a super-rational strategy might resolve the tragedy of the commons without requiring recognition or negotiationCharacterizing the effect of population heterogeneity on evolutionary dynamics on complex networks.Swarm intelligence inspired shills and the evolution of cooperationInfluences of agents with a self-reputation awareness component in an evolutionary spatial IPD game.Inferring reputation promotes the evolution of cooperation in spatial social dilemma gamesEvolution of cooperation in a heterogeneous graph: fixation probabilities under weak selection.Direct reciprocity in spatial populations enhances R-reciprocity as well as ST-reciprocity.Role of investment heterogeneity in the cooperation on spatial public goods game.The role of opportunistic migration in cyclic games.Evolution with reinforcement learning in negotiation.Effect of heterogeneous investments on the evolution of cooperation in spatial public goods game.A double-edged sword: Benefits and pitfalls of heterogeneous punishment in evolutionary inspection games.Optimal interdependence between networks for the evolution of cooperation.Spreading of cooperative behaviour across interdependent groups.Adaptive long-range migration promotes cooperation under tempting conditions.Individual wealth-based selection supports cooperation in spatial public goods games.Impact of social punishment on cooperative behavior in complex networks.From aggregation to dispersion: how habitat fragmentation prevents the emergence of consensual decision making in a groupEvolution of cooperation in multiplex networks.Evolutionary dynamics of time-resolved social interactions.Effect of initial fraction of cooperators on cooperative behavior in evolutionary prisoner's dilemma gameOpportunistic migration in spatial evolutionary games.How costly punishment, diversity, and density of connectivity influence cooperation in a biological network.Role-separating ordering in social dilemmas controlled by topological frustration.Percolation in spatial evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game on two-dimensional lattices.Percolation and cooperation with mobile agents: geometric and strategy clusters.Stochastic win-stay-lose-shift strategy with dynamic aspirations in evolutionary social dilemmas.Evolutionary mixed games in structured populations: Cooperation and the benefits of heterogeneity.Influence of stochastic perturbation of both action updating and strategy updating in mixed-strategy 2×2 games on evolution of cooperation.Social Closure and the Evolution of Cooperation via Indirect ReciprocityVelocity-enhanced cooperation of moving agents playing public goods gamesResearch on Double Price Regulations and Peak Shaving Reserve Mechanism in Coal-Electricity Supply ChainEffects of Empty Sites on Cooperation in the Prisoner’s Dilemma Game Based on Social Diversity
P2860
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P2860
If players are sparse social dilemmas are too: Importance of percolation for evolution of cooperation.
description
2012 nî lūn-bûn
@nan
2012年の論文
@ja
2012年論文
@yue
2012年論文
@zh-hant
2012年論文
@zh-hk
2012年論文
@zh-mo
2012年論文
@zh-tw
2012年论文
@wuu
2012年论文
@zh
2012年论文
@zh-cn
name
If players are sparse social d ...... for evolution of cooperation.
@ast
If players are sparse social d ...... for evolution of cooperation.
@en
type
label
If players are sparse social d ...... for evolution of cooperation.
@ast
If players are sparse social d ...... for evolution of cooperation.
@en
prefLabel
If players are sparse social d ...... for evolution of cooperation.
@ast
If players are sparse social d ...... for evolution of cooperation.
@en
P2860
P50
P356
P1433
P1476
If players are sparse social d ...... n for evolution of cooperation
@en
P2860
P2888
P356
10.1038/SREP00369
P407
P577
2012-04-17T00:00:00Z