Indirect reciprocity can stabilize cooperation without the second-order free rider problem.
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Oxytocin increases generosity in humansFive rules for the evolution of cooperationSelfishness as second-order altruismReputation, a universal currency for human social interactionsEvolutionary establishment of moral and double moral standards through spatial interactionsHuman cooperation: second-order free-riding problem solved?Potential follow-up increases private contributions to public goodsBuilding the Leviathan--Voluntary centralisation of punishment power sustains cooperation in humansLeadership solves collective action problems in small-scale societiesReligion and moralityThe psychosemantics of free riding: dissecting the architecture of a moral conceptHow infants and toddlers react to antisocial othersEndless forms: human behavioural diversity and evolved universalsStabilizing the earth's climate is not a losing game: supporting evidence from public goods experimentsReciprocity, culture and human cooperation: previous insights and a new cross-cultural experimentNo third-party punishment in chimpanzeesSocial transmission and the spread of modern contraception in rural EthiopiaStern-judging: A simple, successful norm which promotes cooperation under indirect reciprocityCulture and the evolution of human cooperation.Evolution of cooperation under indirect reciprocity and arbitrary exploration rates.When agreement-accepting free-riders are a necessary evil for the evolution of cooperationIndirect reciprocity, image scoring, and moral hazardAxelrod's metanorm games on networksMarkets, religion, community size, and the evolution of fairness and punishment.Network homophily and the evolution of the pay-it-forward reciprocity.Punishment and spite, the dark side of cooperationImages of eyes enhance investments in a real-life public goodCyclic dominance in evolutionary games: a review.Inferring reputation promotes the evolution of cooperation in spatial social dilemma gamesCognitive Adaptations for n-person Exchange: The Evolutionary Roots of Organizational Behavior.Both loved and feared: third party punishers are viewed as formidable and likeable, but these reputational benefits may only be open to dominant individuals.What are punishment and reputation for?Evolution of indirect reciprocity.Young children are more generous when others are aware of their actions.Direct and indirect punishment among strangers in the field.When punishment pays.The co-evolution of fairness preferences and costly punishment.Via freedom to coercion: the emergence of costly punishment.Do good actions inspire good actions in others?Criminal defectors lead to the emergence of cooperation in an experimental, adversarial game.
P2860
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P2860
Indirect reciprocity can stabilize cooperation without the second-order free rider problem.
description
2004 nî lūn-bûn
@nan
2004年の論文
@ja
2004年論文
@yue
2004年論文
@zh-hant
2004年論文
@zh-hk
2004年論文
@zh-mo
2004年論文
@zh-tw
2004年论文
@wuu
2004年论文
@zh
2004年论文
@zh-cn
name
Indirect reciprocity can stabi ...... cond-order free rider problem.
@en
type
label
Indirect reciprocity can stabi ...... cond-order free rider problem.
@en
prefLabel
Indirect reciprocity can stabi ...... cond-order free rider problem.
@en
P2860
P356
P1433
P1476
Indirect reciprocity can stabi ...... cond-order free rider problem.
@en
P2093
Karthik Panchanathan
Robert Boyd
P2860
P2888
P304
P356
10.1038/NATURE02978
P407
P577
2004-11-01T00:00:00Z
P5875
P6179
1049155919