Group beneficial norms can spread rapidly in a structured population.
about
Why humans might help strangersA review of norms and normative multiagent systemsThe evolution of altruistic punishmentCulture and the evolution of human cooperation.The puzzle of monogamous marriage.Evolutionary dynamics in structured populationsDopamine D4 receptor gene associated with fairness preference in ultimatum gameA general model of the public goods dilemma.Markets, religion, community size, and the evolution of fairness and punishment.Network homophily and the evolution of the pay-it-forward reciprocity.Transmission coupling mechanisms: cultural group selectionThe ecology of religious beliefsThe coevolution of cultural groups and ingroup favoritism.The origin and evolution of religious prosociality.Effects of conformism on the cultural evolution of social behaviour.Evolution of cooperation by multilevel selection.Long-term fidelity of foraging techniques in common marmosets (Callithrix jacchus)Emergence of Shared Intentionality Is Coupled to the Advance of Cumulative Culture.The evolution of altruistic social preferences in human groupsTransforming the dilemma.Beyond existence and aiming outside the laboratory: estimating frequency-dependent and pay-off-biased social learning strategies.Culture rather than genes provides greater scope for the evolution of large-scale human prosociality.Questioning the cultural evolution of altruism.The Costs and Benefits of Calculation and Moral Rules.The Evolution of Human Uniqueness.Experimental and theoretical models of human cultural evolution.Evolutionary contributions to the study of human fertility.Indirect reciprocity can stabilize cooperation without the second-order free rider problem.Indirect reciprocity is sensitive to costs of information transfer.Analytical results for individual and group selection of any intensity.The emergence of human prosociality: aligning with others through feelings, concerns, and normsRapid cultural adaptation can facilitate the evolution of large-scale cooperation.Cultural group selection plays an essential role in explaining human cooperation: A sketch of the evidence.Interethnic Interaction, Strategic Bargaining Power, and the Dynamics of Cultural Norms : A Field Study in an Amazonian Population.The economic origins of ultrasociality.Co-residence patterns in hunter-gatherer societies show unique human social structure.Explaining group-level traits requires distinguishing process from product.Self-Interest and the Design of Rules.Partner selection, coordination games, and group selection.Evolutionary stability in continuous nonlinear public goods games.
P2860
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P2860
Group beneficial norms can spread rapidly in a structured population.
description
2002 nî lūn-bûn
@nan
2002年の論文
@ja
2002年学术文章
@wuu
2002年学术文章
@zh-cn
2002年学术文章
@zh-hans
2002年学术文章
@zh-my
2002年学术文章
@zh-sg
2002年學術文章
@yue
2002年學術文章
@zh
2002年學術文章
@zh-hant
name
Group beneficial norms can spread rapidly in a structured population.
@en
Group beneficial norms can spread rapidly in a structured population.
@nl
type
label
Group beneficial norms can spread rapidly in a structured population.
@en
Group beneficial norms can spread rapidly in a structured population.
@nl
prefLabel
Group beneficial norms can spread rapidly in a structured population.
@en
Group beneficial norms can spread rapidly in a structured population.
@nl
P356
P1476
Group beneficial norms can spread rapidly in a structured population.
@en
P2093
Peter J Richerson
Robert Boyd
P304
P356
10.1006/JTBI.2001.2515
P407
P577
2002-04-01T00:00:00Z