Indirect reciprocity provides only a narrow margin of efficiency for costly punishment.
about
Reputation, a universal currency for human social interactionsBuilding the Leviathan--Voluntary centralisation of punishment power sustains cooperation in humansEvolving righteousness in a corrupt world.Groupwise information sharing promotes ingroup favoritism in indirect reciprocity.Evolution of cooperation under indirect reciprocity and arbitrary exploration rates.The concepts of asymmetric and symmetric power can help resolve the puzzle of altruistic and cooperative behaviour.Optimal distribution of incentives for public cooperation in heterogeneous interaction environments.Indirect reciprocity under incomplete observation.The evolution of reputation-based partner-switching behaviors with a costThe immuno-dynamics of conflict intervention in social systemsSpecial agents can promote cooperation in the populationPunishment sustains large-scale cooperation in prestate warfare.Reciprocity: weak or strong? What punishment experiments do (and do not) demonstrate.Risking your life without a second thought: intuitive decision-making and extreme altruismDirect and indirect punishment among strangers in the field.Reward from punishment does not emerge at all costsThe co-evolution of fairness preferences and costly punishment.An evolutionary model of cooperation, fairness and altruistic punishment in public good games.Impact of small groups with heterogeneous preference on behavioral evolution in population evacuation.The Effect of Incentives and Meta-incentives on the Evolution of Cooperation.Reputation Effects in Public and Private Interactions.Social Norms of Cooperation in Small-Scale Societies.Deception Undermines the Stability of Cooperation in Games of Indirect Reciprocity.Stochastic evolutionary dynamics resolve the Traveler's DilemmaTransient nature of cooperation by pay-it-forward reciprocityModels of social evolution: can we do better to predict 'who helps whom to achieve what'?Cheating and punishment in cooperative animal societiesPowering up with indirect reciprocity in a large-scale field experiment.Social image concerns promote cooperation more than altruistic punishment.Evolution of gossip-based indirect reciprocity on a bipartite network.Understanding disgust.Third-party punishers are rewarded, but third-party helpers even more so.Evolution of cooperation by the introduction of the probabilistic peer-punishment based on the difference of payoff.Good agreements make good friendsIndirect reciprocity can overcome free-rider problems on costly moral assessment.Sustainable institutionalized punishment requires elimination of second-order free-riders.The evolution of conditional moral assessment in indirect reciprocity.A Dominant Social Comparison Heuristic Unites Alternative Mechanisms for the Evolution of Indirect Reciprocity.Largest Laplacian eigenvalue predicts the emergence of costly punishment in the evolutionary ultimatum game on networks.Competition of individual and institutional punishments in spatial public goods games.
P2860
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P2860
Indirect reciprocity provides only a narrow margin of efficiency for costly punishment.
description
2009 nî lūn-bûn
@nan
2009年の論文
@ja
2009年学术文章
@wuu
2009年学术文章
@zh
2009年学术文章
@zh-cn
2009年学术文章
@zh-hans
2009年学术文章
@zh-my
2009年学术文章
@zh-sg
2009年學術文章
@yue
2009年學術文章
@zh-hant
name
Indirect reciprocity provides only a narrow margin of efficiency for costly punishment.
@en
Indirect reciprocity provides only a narrow margin of efficiency for costly punishment.
@nl
type
label
Indirect reciprocity provides only a narrow margin of efficiency for costly punishment.
@en
Indirect reciprocity provides only a narrow margin of efficiency for costly punishment.
@nl
prefLabel
Indirect reciprocity provides only a narrow margin of efficiency for costly punishment.
@en
Indirect reciprocity provides only a narrow margin of efficiency for costly punishment.
@nl
P2860
P356
P1433
P1476
Indirect reciprocity provides only a narrow margin of efficiency for costly punishment.
@en
P2093
Hisashi Ohtsuki
Martin A Nowak
P2860
P2888
P356
10.1038/NATURE07601
P407
P50
P577
2009-01-01T00:00:00Z
P5875
P6179
1006987829