Sustainable institutionalized punishment requires elimination of second-order free-riders.
about
Building the Leviathan--Voluntary centralisation of punishment power sustains cooperation in humansThe coevolution of overconfidence and bluffing in the resource competition game.Voluntary rewards mediate the evolution of pool punishment for maintaining public goods in large populations.Sanctions as honest signals--the evolution of pool punishment by public sanctioning institutions.Optimal distribution of incentives for public cooperation in heterogeneous interaction environments.If cooperation is likely punish mildly: insights from economic experiments based on the snowdrift gamePunitive preferences, monetary incentives and tacit coordination in the punishment of defectors promote cooperation in humansEvolution of public cooperation in a monitored society with implicated punishment and within-group enforcement.Evolutionary dynamics of group interactions on structured populations: a review.How human location-specific contact patterns impact spatial transmission between populations?When hawks give rise to doves: the evolution and transition of enforcement strategiesThe dynamics of human behavior in the public goods game with institutional incentivesImpact of social punishment on cooperative behavior in complex networks.Solving the second-order free rider problem in a public goods game: An experiment using a leader support systemDemocratic decisions establish stable authorities that overcome the paradox of second-order punishmentHeterogeneous resource allocation can change social hierarchy in public goods games.The Evolution of Cooperation Through Institutional Incentives and Optional Participation.Perceived Shared Condemnation Intensifies Punitive Moral Emotions.Bluffing promotes overconfidence on social networksRewards and the evolution of cooperation in public good games.Emergence of responsible sanctions without second order free riders, antisocial punishment or spite.Punishing second-order free riders before first-order free riders: The effect of pool punishment priority on cooperation.The co-evolution of social institutions, demography, and large-scale human cooperation.Solving the collective-risk social dilemma with risky assets in well-mixed and structured populations.Antisocial pool rewarding does not deter public cooperation.The evolution of anti-social rewarding and its countermeasures in public goods games.Cost-effective external interference for promoting the evolution of cooperation
P2860
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P2860
Sustainable institutionalized punishment requires elimination of second-order free-riders.
description
2012 nî lūn-bûn
@nan
2012年の論文
@ja
2012年論文
@yue
2012年論文
@zh-hant
2012年論文
@zh-hk
2012年論文
@zh-mo
2012年論文
@zh-tw
2012年论文
@wuu
2012年论文
@zh
2012年论文
@zh-cn
name
Sustainable institutionalized ...... n of second-order free-riders.
@en
Sustainable institutionalized ...... n of second-order free-riders.
@nl
type
label
Sustainable institutionalized ...... n of second-order free-riders.
@en
Sustainable institutionalized ...... n of second-order free-riders.
@nl
prefLabel
Sustainable institutionalized ...... n of second-order free-riders.
@en
Sustainable institutionalized ...... n of second-order free-riders.
@nl
P2860
P356
P1433
P1476
Sustainable institutionalized ...... n of second-order free-riders.
@en
P2860
P2888
P356
10.1038/SREP00344
P407
P50
P577
2012-03-30T00:00:00Z