Subtracting "ought" from "is": descriptivism versus normativism in the study of human thinking.
about
Moral judgment as information processing: an integrative reviewQuestions and challenges for the new psychology of reasoningHow (not) to draw philosophical implications from the cognitive nature of concepts: the case of intentionalityThe nature of thinking, shallow and deep.When fast logic meets slow belief: Evidence for a parallel-processing model of belief bias.Cognitive success: instrumental justifications of normative systems of reasoning.Modeling causal conditional reasoning data using SDT: caveats and new insights.Physiological plausibility and boundary conditions of theories of risk sensitivityRationality, perception, and the all-seeing eyeThe outlandish, the realistic, and the real: contextual manipulation and agent role effects in trolley problemsThe Bayesian boom: good thing or bad?From is to ought, and back: how normative concerns foster progress in reasoning research.The intersection between Descriptivism and Meliorism in reasoning research: further proposals in support of 'soft normativism'.The role of conviction and narrative in decision-making under radical uncertainty.Formalizing heuristics in decision-making: a quantum probability perspective.Many faces of rationality: Implications of the great rationality debate for clinical decision-making.New normative standards of conditional reasoning and the dual-source modelNormativity, interpretation, and Bayesian models.Development and necessary norms of reasoning.How (not) to argue about is/ought inferences in the cognitive sciencesThe uses and abuses of the coherence - correspondence distinction.Editorial: From Is to Ought: The Place of Normative Models in the Study of Human Thought.Against a normative view of folk psychology.Utilitarian Moral Judgment Exclusively Coheres with Inference from Is to Ought.Rationality and the illusion of choice.Alleviating the concerns with the SDT approach to reasoning: reply to Singmann and Kellen (2014).In search for a standard of rationality.The empirical study of norms is just what we are missing.Heuristics and biases: interactions among numeracy, ability, and reflectiveness predict normative responding.Slower is not always better: Response-time evidence clarifies the limited role of miserly information processing in the Cognitive Reflection Test.Rational decision making in medicine: Implications for overuse and underuse.Local Choices: Rationality and the Contextuality of Decision-Making.Category effects on stimulus estimation: Shifting and skewed frequency distributions-A reexamination.A Blind Spot in Research on Foreign Language Effects in Judgment and Decision-Making.Motivational Reasons for Biased Decisions: The Sunk-Cost Effect's Instrumental Rationality.A Neural Network Framework for Cognitive Bias
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P2860
Subtracting "ought" from "is": descriptivism versus normativism in the study of human thinking.
description
2011 nî lūn-bûn
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2011年の論文
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2011年学术文章
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2011年学术文章
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2011年学术文章
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2011年学术文章
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2011年学术文章
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name
Subtracting "ought" from "is": ...... n the study of human thinking.
@en
Subtracting "ought" from "is": ...... n the study of human thinking.
@nl
type
label
Subtracting "ought" from "is": ...... n the study of human thinking.
@en
Subtracting "ought" from "is": ...... n the study of human thinking.
@nl
prefLabel
Subtracting "ought" from "is": ...... n the study of human thinking.
@en
Subtracting "ought" from "is": ...... n the study of human thinking.
@nl
P1476
Subtracting "ought" from "is": ...... n the study of human thinking.
@en
P2093
Jonathan St B T Evans
Shira Elqayam
P304
233-48; discussion 249-90
P356
10.1017/S0140525X1100001X
P407
P577
2011-10-01T00:00:00Z