The leading eight: social norms that can maintain cooperation by indirect reciprocity.
about
Reputation, a universal currency for human social interactionsUpstream reciprocity and the evolution of gratitudeDigital cows grazing on digital groundsStern-judging: A simple, successful norm which promotes cooperation under indirect reciprocityGroupwise information sharing promotes ingroup favoritism in indirect reciprocity.Evolution of cooperation under indirect reciprocity and arbitrary exploration rates.Indirect reciprocity under incomplete observation.The evolution of reputation-based partner-switching behaviors with a costEvolution of interactions and cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game.Inferring reputation promotes the evolution of cooperation in spatial social dilemma gamesRisking your life without a second thought: intuitive decision-making and extreme altruismCoevolution of trustful buyers and cooperative sellers in the trust game.Evolution of indirect reciprocity.Reward from punishment does not emerge at all costsDynamical models explaining social balance and evolution of cooperation.Gossip as an alternative for direct observation in games of indirect reciprocity.Preschool children's behavioral tendency toward social indirect reciprocity.Dynamic remodeling of in-group bias during the 2008 presidential election.Direct sum matrix game with prisoner's dilemma and snowdrift game.Cooperate without looking: why we care what people think and not just what they do.The effects of reputational and social knowledge on cooperation.Reputation Effects in Public and Private Interactions.If players are sparse social dilemmas are too: Importance of percolation for evolution of cooperation.Social Norms of Cooperation in Small-Scale Societies.Deception Undermines the Stability of Cooperation in Games of Indirect Reciprocity.Stochastic evolutionary dynamics resolve the Traveler's DilemmaIndirect Reciprocity; A Field Experiment.Socially Enforced Nepotism: How Norms and Reputation Can Amplify Kin Altruism.Multiple reputation domains and cooperative behaviour in two Latin American communitiesCorrelated pay-offs are key to cooperationEvolution of fairness in the one-shot anonymous Ultimatum Game.Transforming the dilemma.Powering up with indirect reciprocity in a large-scale field experiment.COOPERATION MAINTAINED BY FITNESS ADJUSTMENT.Reputation-based partner choice promotes cooperation in social networks.Evolution of gossip-based indirect reciprocity on a bipartite network.Intergroup Biases in Fear-induced AggressionMoral assessment in indirect reciprocity.When is bigger better? The effects of group size on the evolution of helping behaviours.Reputation can enhance or suppress cooperation through positive feedback.
P2860
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P2860
The leading eight: social norms that can maintain cooperation by indirect reciprocity.
description
2005 nî lūn-bûn
@nan
2005年の論文
@ja
2005年学术文章
@wuu
2005年学术文章
@zh
2005年学术文章
@zh-cn
2005年学术文章
@zh-hans
2005年学术文章
@zh-my
2005年学术文章
@zh-sg
2005年學術文章
@yue
2005年學術文章
@zh-hant
name
The leading eight: social norms that can maintain cooperation by indirect reciprocity.
@en
The leading eight: social norms that can maintain cooperation by indirect reciprocity.
@nl
type
label
The leading eight: social norms that can maintain cooperation by indirect reciprocity.
@en
The leading eight: social norms that can maintain cooperation by indirect reciprocity.
@nl
prefLabel
The leading eight: social norms that can maintain cooperation by indirect reciprocity.
@en
The leading eight: social norms that can maintain cooperation by indirect reciprocity.
@nl
P1476
The leading eight: social norms that can maintain cooperation by indirect reciprocity.
@en
P2093
Hisashi Ohtsuki
P304
P356
10.1016/J.JTBI.2005.08.008
P407
P50
P577
2005-09-19T00:00:00Z