Covenants with and without a Sword: Self-Governance Is Possible
about
Dynamic social networks promote cooperation in experiments with humansMonoamine oxidase A gene (MAOA) predicts behavioral aggression following provocationAversive Learning and Trait Aggression Influence Retaliatory BehaviorBuilding the Leviathan--Voluntary centralisation of punishment power sustains cooperation in humansA Behavioral Approach to the Rational Choice Theory of Collective Action: Presidential Address, American Political Science Association, 1997Reciprocity, culture and human cooperation: previous insights and a new cross-cultural experimentAltruistic punishment in humans.The puzzle of human cooperation.Religiosity as a public good.Trust, Punishment, and Cooperation Across 18 Societies: A Meta-Analysis.Positive interactions promote public cooperation.Axelrod's metanorm games on networksConditions for the emergence of shared norms in populations with incompatible preferencesCoordinated punishment of defectors sustains cooperation and can proliferate when rare.Culture and cooperationConditional cooperation and costly monitoring explain success in forest commons management.Reciprocity: weak or strong? What punishment experiments do (and do not) demonstrate.The nature of human altruism.The hard problem of cooperation.Both loved and feared: third party punishers are viewed as formidable and likeable, but these reputational benefits may only be open to dominant individuals.Competition over personal resources favors contribution to shared resources in human groupsLeadership in an egalitarian society.Criminal defectors lead to the emergence of cooperation in an experimental, adversarial game.Exit, punishment and rewards in commons dilemmas: an experimental studyWho cries wolf, and when? Manipulation of perceived threats to preserve rank in cooperative groupsThe effect of power asymmetries on cooperation and punishment in a prisoner's dilemma gamePunitive preferences, monetary incentives and tacit coordination in the punishment of defectors promote cooperation in humansThe evolution of antisocial punishment in optional public goods gamesHow institutions shaped the last major evolutionary transition to large-scale human societiesGender, social norms, and survival in maritime disastersCooperation and assortativity with dynamic partner updatingCounter-Punishment, Communication, and Cooperation among PartnersPunish and voice: punishment enhances cooperation when combined with norm-signalling.Short-Run Prosocial Behavior in Response to Receiving Corrections and Affirmations in Three Therapeutic Communities.Monopolizing Sanctioning Power under Noise Eliminates Perverse Punishment But Does Not Increase Cooperation.Credible enforcement policies under illegal fishing: does individual transferable quotas induce to reduce the gap between approved and proposed allowable catches?Similarity increases altruistic punishment in humans.Quality versus quantity of social ties in experimental cooperative networks.Towards a biopsychological understanding of costly punishment: the role of basal cortisol.Solving the second-order free rider problem in a public goods game: An experiment using a leader support system
P2860
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P2860
Covenants with and without a Sword: Self-Governance Is Possible
description
im Juni 1992 veröffentlichter wissenschaftlicher Artikel
@de
wetenschappelijk artikel
@nl
наукова стаття, опублікована в червні 1992
@uk
name
Covenants with and without a Sword: Self-Governance Is Possible
@en
Covenants with and without a Sword: Self-Governance Is Possible
@nl
type
label
Covenants with and without a Sword: Self-Governance Is Possible
@en
Covenants with and without a Sword: Self-Governance Is Possible
@nl
prefLabel
Covenants with and without a Sword: Self-Governance Is Possible
@en
Covenants with and without a Sword: Self-Governance Is Possible
@nl
P2860
P356
P1476
Covenants with and without a Sword: Self-Governance Is Possible
@en
P2093
James Walker
Roy Gardner
P2860
P304
P356
10.2307/1964229
P577
1992-06-01T00:00:00Z