Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
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Oxytocin and Vasopressin Receptor Gene Polymorphisms: Role in Social and Psychiatric TraitsA Grammar of InstitutionsA Behavioral Approach to the Rational Choice Theory of Collective Action: Presidential Address, American Political Science Association, 1997Reciprocity, culture and human cooperation: previous insights and a new cross-cultural experimentTo qualify as a social partner, humans hide severe punishment, although their observed cooperativeness is decisiveIndividual Characteristics vs. Experience: An Experimental Study on Cooperation in Prisoner's DilemmaA mixture of "cheats" and "co-operators" can enable maximal group benefit.The inter-group comparison-intra-group cooperation hypothesis: comparisons between groups increase efficiency in public goods provisionGender differences in cooperation: experimental evidence on high school students.Effect of resource spatial correlation and hunter-fisher-gatherer mobility on social cooperation in Tierra del FuegoInstitutionalize Reciprocity to Overcome the Public Goods Provision Problem.The socialization effect on decision making in the Prisoner's Dilemma game: An eye-tracking study.Co-action provides rational basis for the evolutionary success of Pavlovian strategies.Multinational investigation of cross-societal cooperation.Expert Game experiment predicts emergence of trust in professional communication networks.Resilient cooperators stabilize long-run cooperation in the finitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemma.Network Modularity is essential for evolution of cooperation under uncertainty.Symmetry warrants rational cooperation by co-action in Social Dilemmas.Transparency and cooperation in repeated dilemma games: a meta study.A strategy with novel evolutionary features for the iterated prisoner's dilemma.Payoff-based learning explains the decline in cooperation in public goods games.Selective play: choosing partners in an uncertain world.Levels of analysis and the explanation of the costs and benefits of cooperation.Coevolution between positive reciprocity, punishment, and partner switching in repeated interactions.Evidence for strategic cooperation in humans.Covenants with and without a Sword: Self-Governance Is PossibleAltruism in ExperimentsOskar Morgenstern and the Heterodox Potentialities of the Application of Game Theory to EconomicsDoes Heart or Head Rule Donor Behaviors in Charitable Crowdfunding Markets?Human resource management and productivity in the “trust game corporation”Sustaining Group ReputationGame theory and corporate governance: conditions for effective stewardship of companies exposed to climate change risksINFLUENCE OF ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGES ON COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR IN THE PRISONER'S DILEMMA GAME ON AN ARTIFICIAL SOCIAL MODELA Study of Prisoner’s Dilemma Game Model with Incomplete InformationAn Efficient Approach for Stimulating Cooperation among Nodes in Wireless Sensor NetworksStrategic Reasoning: Building Cognitive Models from Logical Formulas
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P2860
Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
description
article
@en
im August 1982 veröffentlichter wissenschaftlicher Artikel
@de
wetenschappelijk artikel
@nl
наукова стаття, опублікована в серпні 1982
@uk
ലേഖനം
@ml
name
Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
@en
Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
@nl
type
label
Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
@en
Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
@nl
prefLabel
Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
@en
Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
@nl
P2093
P1476
Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
@en
P2093
David M Kreps
John Roberts
Robert Wilson
P304
P356
10.1016/0022-0531(82)90029-1
P50
P577
1982-08-01T00:00:00Z