From extortion to generosity, evolution in the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma.
about
Punishment based on public benefit fund significantly promotes cooperationHumans choose representatives who enforce cooperation in social dilemmas through extortionSwarm intelligence inspired shills and the evolution of cooperationDefection and extortion as unexpected catalysts of unconditional cooperation in structured populationsThe evolutionary advantage of heritable phenotypic heterogeneity.Cooperation and control in multiplayer social dilemmasCollapse of cooperation in evolving gamesAdaptive dynamics of extortion and compliance.Forgiver triumphs in alternating Prisoner's Dilemma.Co-evolutionary dynamics of collective action with signaling for a quorum.The art of war: beyond memory-one strategies in population gamesEvolution of Conformity in Social DilemmasSocial Norms of Cooperation in Small-Scale Societies.Zero-Determinant Strategies in Iterated Public Goods Game.Asymmetric Power Boosts Extortion in an Economic Experiment.The Emergence of Relationship-based Cooperation.Autocratic strategies for iterated games with arbitrary action spacesExtortion can outperform generosity in the iterated prisoner's dilemmaComparing reactive and memory-one strategies of direct reciprocity.Evolutionary consequences of behavioral diversity.An oscillating tragedy of the commons in replicator dynamics with game-environment feedback.Evolutionary performance of zero-determinant strategies in multiplayer games.Extortion subdues human players but is finally punished in the prisoner's dilemmaExtortion under uncertainty: Zero-determinant strategies in noisy games.Partners or rivals? Strategies for the iterated prisoner's dilemmaSmall groups and long memories promote cooperation.Memory-n strategies of direct reciprocity.Stags, Hawks, and Doves: Social Evolution Theory and Individual Variation in Cooperation.Evolution of cooperation in a particular case of the infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma with three strategies.Boosting cooperation by involving extortion in spatial prisoner's dilemma games.On selection in finite populations.Evolution of extortion in structured populations.Accurate reactions open up the way for more cooperative societies.Detecting reciprocity at a global scale.Crosstalk in concurrent repeated games impedes direct reciprocity and requires stronger levels of forgiveness.Fostering cooperation of selfish agents through public goods in relation to the loners.Social Closure and the Evolution of Cooperation via Indirect Reciprocity
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P2860
From extortion to generosity, evolution in the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma.
description
article científic
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article scientifique
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articolo scientifico
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artigo científico
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bilimsel makale
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scientific article published on 03 September 2013
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vedecký článok
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vetenskaplig artikel
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videnskabelig artikel
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vědecký článek
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name
From extortion to generosity, evolution in the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma.
@en
From extortion to generosity, evolution in the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma.
@nl
type
label
From extortion to generosity, evolution in the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma.
@en
From extortion to generosity, evolution in the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma.
@nl
prefLabel
From extortion to generosity, evolution in the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma.
@en
From extortion to generosity, evolution in the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma.
@nl
P2860
P356
P1476
From extortion to generosity, evolution in the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma
@en
P2860
P304
15348-15353
P356
10.1073/PNAS.1306246110
P407
P577
2013-09-03T00:00:00Z