about
Paradigm shifts and the interplay between state, business and civil sectorsBraess's paradox in epidemic game: better condition results in less payoff.Evolution of global cooperation driven by risks.Climate policies under wealth inequalityCooperation prevails when individuals adjust their social tiesChromodynamics of cooperation in finite populationsSpatial invasion of cooperation.Mechanistic constraints and the unlikely evolution of reciprocal cooperation.The evolution of prompt reaction to adverse ties.Population structure induces a symmetry breaking favoring the emergence of cooperationEvolution of cooperation on stochastic dynamical networks.Characterizing the effect of population heterogeneity on evolutionary dynamics on complex networks.Voluntary Vaccination through Self-organizing Behaviors on Locally-mixed Social Networks.Evolutionary dynamics of N-person Hawk-Dove gamesSanctions as honest signals--the evolution of pool punishment by public sanctioning institutions.Imperfect vaccine aggravates the long-standing dilemma of voluntary vaccinationMoving away from nasty encounters enhances cooperation in ecological prisoner's dilemma game.From local to global dilemmas in social networksReputation-based conditional interaction supports cooperation in well-mixed prisoner's dilemmas.Consistent strategy updating in spatial and non-spatial behavioral experiments does not promote cooperation in social networksReward from punishment does not emerge at all costsCollapse of cooperation in evolving gamesEffects of conformism on the cultural evolution of social behaviour.Avoiding or restricting defectors in public goods games?Adaptive dynamics of extortion and compliance.Risk of collective failure provides an escape from the tragedy of the commons.Co-evolutionary dynamics of collective action with signaling for a quorum.Evolution of all-or-none strategies in repeated public goods dilemmas.The emergence of cooperation from a single mutant during microbial life cycles.Social Norms of Cooperation in Small-Scale Societies.Evolution of Cooperation in Social Dilemmas on Complex Networks.Structural power and the evolution of collective fairness in social networks.Generosity motivated by acceptance--evolutionary analysis of an anticipation game.Evolutionary graph theory: breaking the symmetry between interaction and replacement.Evolution of collective action in adaptive social structures.Evolution of extortion in Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma games.Evolving synergetic interactions.From extortion to generosity, evolution in the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma.Evolutionary consequences of behavioral diversity.Direct reciprocity on graphs.
P2860
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P2860
description
2006 nî lūn-bûn
@nan
2006年の論文
@ja
2006年論文
@yue
2006年論文
@zh-hant
2006年論文
@zh-hk
2006年論文
@zh-mo
2006年論文
@zh-tw
2006年论文
@wuu
2006年论文
@zh
2006年论文
@zh-cn
name
Stochastic dynamics of invasion and fixation.
@en
Stochastic dynamics of invasion and fixation.
@nl
type
label
Stochastic dynamics of invasion and fixation.
@en
Stochastic dynamics of invasion and fixation.
@nl
prefLabel
Stochastic dynamics of invasion and fixation.
@en
Stochastic dynamics of invasion and fixation.
@nl
P2860
P1433
P1476
Stochastic dynamics of invasion and fixation.
@en
P2093
Arne Traulsen
Martin A Nowak
P2860
P304
P356
10.1103/PHYSREVE.74.011909
P407
P433
P577
2006-07-17T00:00:00Z
P698
P818
q-bio/0609020