No pure strategy is evolutionarily stable in the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma game
about
E pluribus unum?Burying the vehicleThe importance of mechanisms for the evolution of cooperationEndless forms: human behavioural diversity and evolved universalsAsymmetric interaction paired with a super-rational strategy might resolve the tragedy of the commons without requiring recognition or negotiationMechanistic constraints and the unlikely evolution of reciprocal cooperation.Evolutionary dynamics on stochastic evolving networks for multiple-strategy games.The structure of mutations and the evolution of cooperation.Adaptive dynamics of extortion and compliance.Asymmetric interaction and indeterminate fitness correlation between cooperative partners in the fig-fig wasp mutualismEvolution of Conformity in Social DilemmasDirect reciprocity in structured populationsExtortion can outperform generosity in the iterated prisoner's dilemmaComparing reactive and memory-one strategies of direct reciprocity.Extortion subdues human players but is finally punished in the prisoner's dilemmaMemory-n strategies of direct reciprocity.From rationality to cooperativeness: The totally mixed Nash equilibrium in Markov strategies in the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma.Stags, Hawks, and Doves: Social Evolution Theory and Individual Variation in Cooperation.A strategy with novel evolutionary features for the iterated prisoner's dilemma.Crossover and evolutionary stability in the prisoner's dilemma.The evolution of cooperation in asymmetric systems.Reintroducing group selection to the human behavioral sciencesShowing off, handicap signaling, and the evolution of men's workLimit Cycles Sparked by Mutation in the Repeated Prisoner's DilemmaAn Open Framework for the Reproducible Study of the Iterated Prisoner’s DilemmaTripartism: Regulatory Capture and EmpowermentSome philosophical implications of the rehabilitation of group selection
P2860
Q22162475-4B7FC2EF-38A0-406C-8334-38F5F202C24EQ22162476-42536522-AA5F-4923-AFE0-24F6028BFAACQ27329145-6C0CD43D-45E7-4D6E-8753-DAB2FEF821A0Q28743775-C4ED9324-3229-406D-A0FC-B87D40F65A5BQ30420718-22F534DE-22AD-4C81-B4EE-4199768013F8Q33358021-9577C924-D915-4C12-9441-867E1F23EB92Q34105370-0A2F35E8-662C-4FE6-A25F-0119333975F3Q34259676-09059AC4-783F-4D87-841E-06E8B2C0D07FQ35040705-058B33DF-9840-428F-9343-F467053F1973Q35185436-7971D806-ED26-4AB6-8EC9-2DC8A6253C7CQ35761086-3E8BF90D-6C92-455A-B16D-96BBAA7F20A2Q36056508-4797E926-F454-4547-91E2-CE4F7012DA3EQ36799150-683F4557-0472-4C01-9D99-C6E8CB653EBFQ36886368-E9B0B8F6-05C7-4BBB-BD1E-0D464B5FAC86Q40470222-3DE49053-5B3D-4940-908B-4D814DD60C6DQ43083692-DC141E14-5565-4F7E-9882-351D2CB007B4Q47133615-B896B1E5-BEF3-4CA3-A018-A8A9E2F1E9F9Q47294092-55F949DE-532C-459B-A1DD-43C95813D6AFQ50746687-BD2510B1-BCAC-4676-81C0-C07324D5773DQ50891024-C4566D82-566B-4680-A193-E41C8497BF6DQ51626818-F58453D2-680D-4C33-8798-B51CAF9B808DQ56269048-E4079D4F-6E4E-4824-ADFC-6B351FBBF9C4Q56485623-24A1EFF5-32E0-4AA0-AF4C-D4A060244116Q56913048-32185C95-0E7C-4059-AA8D-1BBC4E1406ADQ57012835-27BB4B54-AB5F-4019-B543-C40DBB4B107CQ57571365-28A64226-D6B7-49FC-9FE4-9C76740A755EQ57947396-DB6D958C-73B4-4C08-B483-6D4BDE8FE4E5
P2860
No pure strategy is evolutionarily stable in the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma game
description
article publié dans la revue scientifique Nature
@fr
scientific article published in Nature
@en
wetenschappelijk artikel
@nl
наукова стаття, опублікована в Nature в травні 1987
@uk
name
No pure strategy is evolutionarily stable in the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma game
@en
No pure strategy is evolutionarily stable in the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma game
@nl
type
label
No pure strategy is evolutionarily stable in the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma game
@en
No pure strategy is evolutionarily stable in the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma game
@nl
prefLabel
No pure strategy is evolutionarily stable in the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma game
@en
No pure strategy is evolutionarily stable in the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma game
@nl
P356
P1433
P1476
No pure strategy is evolutionarily stable in the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma game
@en
P2093
Jeffrey P. Lorberbaum
Robert Boyd
P2888
P356
10.1038/327058A0
P407
P577
1987-05-01T00:00:00Z
P6179
1047557145