The take-it-or-leave-it option allows small penalties to overcome social dilemmas.
about
Decoding covert motivations of free riding and cooperation from multi-feature pattern analysis of EEG signalsFirst carrot, then stick: how the adaptive hybridization of incentives promotes cooperation.Voluntary rewards mediate the evolution of pool punishment for maintaining public goods in large populations.Sanctions as honest signals--the evolution of pool punishment by public sanctioning institutions.Optimal distribution of incentives for public cooperation in heterogeneous interaction environments.Cyclic dominance in evolutionary games: a review.The co-evolution of fairness preferences and costly punishment.Exit, punishment and rewards in commons dilemmas: an experimental studyEvolution of all-or-none strategies in repeated public goods dilemmas.The Effect of Incentives and Meta-incentives on the Evolution of Cooperation.Evolution of public cooperation in a monitored society with implicated punishment and within-group enforcement.The dynamics of human behavior in the public goods game with institutional incentivesIndividual wealth-based selection supports cooperation in spatial public goods games.Resource heterogeneity can facilitate cooperation.Democratic decisions establish stable authorities that overcome the paradox of second-order punishmentThe role of institutional incentives and the exemplar in promoting cooperationWhen is bigger better? The effects of group size on the evolution of helping behaviours.The Evolution of Cooperation Through Institutional Incentives and Optional Participation.Evolutionary performance of zero-determinant strategies in multiplayer games.Recidivism and rehabilitation of criminal offenders: a carrot and stick evolutionary game.Rewards and the evolution of cooperation in public good games.The co-evolution of social institutions, demography, and large-scale human cooperation.Evolutionary prisoner's dilemma on evolving random networks.Social science: Carrot or stick?Competition and cooperation among different punishing strategies in the spatial public goods game.The evolution of anti-social rewarding and its countermeasures in public goods games.The evolution of cooperation by social exclusion.Discriminative host sanction together with relatedness promote the cooperation in fig/fig wasp mutualism.Cost-effective external interference for promoting the evolution of cooperation
P2860
Q26779474-0C4DE101-49C6-4470-9937-415A4A479C47Q30611477-109E39E5-D53E-4C9C-8693-62D501A648F4Q33562314-A0462E33-1CF7-40F1-BFAF-BAAB43F95422Q33906547-A7917219-8E23-46FA-A014-1C00DEE993D1Q33937194-D1FE23F6-AD4B-4766-996D-A295CF2F9108Q34311920-62C6BC6F-7E0A-44D0-B1CB-C7E6FD08DEE0Q34633919-4F600FAB-DDF5-4FCF-BC57-2FD352957CE6Q34924672-99585702-2C1D-4D62-A394-C85ED2E75A7EQ35418380-8388F5B1-6242-4B3D-A247-F1FEEC8ADC41Q35631845-5537B8A3-982F-425A-94C1-76B1772CB130Q36310175-E1A3CD9A-8F99-4E66-B3E3-3B93D45ED28FQ37034854-8695B8CB-EB69-41D7-886D-9CE9F7B04A28Q37232881-54519D00-DDDD-4772-834F-A15EADCBE48BQ37250434-3888D13D-6462-4264-83B6-4C16D1FAC13EQ37495101-839F7FB5-E234-4DD3-BDB6-B8D4A7637C55Q37734733-8B5BFE55-4E74-4FBA-A298-8AD284B5CA3FQ38779450-3A8BCB13-9161-40DB-9BC1-6EA5DB4FC194Q39614207-7947FE60-A39E-4827-904B-3828C58F8B07Q40469451-23107124-38C9-4296-BC24-4241F9BB44D2Q41876121-4F19C5C2-295E-47ED-B0AD-5902CF90C09EQ41897681-64313757-11C4-4A60-BF88-BCBB573D2004Q45766095-B6CC6203-5684-475A-AFAE-82843E6618FEQ47876124-A751AA1E-C5A6-4D89-95E2-C0EFC126CD7AQ48005220-61E9A825-0F02-43CA-B7D8-3706D77F008FQ50570214-E8908245-9807-433A-B518-B25F1A230A29Q51391553-82006C67-4BDF-42F9-BC0B-6FFDD2D3F9DAQ51543678-48ECD32F-767F-4C60-A3C7-6D9DA82C8F84Q52791365-8D1BC0A0-E7CB-4A29-831E-BFAA5E823543Q58098968-82402129-6A0E-40B9-A440-AE764FCA85D9
P2860
The take-it-or-leave-it option allows small penalties to overcome social dilemmas.
description
2012 nî lūn-bûn
@nan
2012年の論文
@ja
2012年論文
@yue
2012年論文
@zh-hant
2012年論文
@zh-hk
2012年論文
@zh-mo
2012年論文
@zh-tw
2012年论文
@wuu
2012年论文
@zh
2012年论文
@zh-cn
name
The take-it-or-leave-it option allows small penalties to overcome social dilemmas.
@ast
The take-it-or-leave-it option allows small penalties to overcome social dilemmas.
@en
type
label
The take-it-or-leave-it option allows small penalties to overcome social dilemmas.
@ast
The take-it-or-leave-it option allows small penalties to overcome social dilemmas.
@en
prefLabel
The take-it-or-leave-it option allows small penalties to overcome social dilemmas.
@ast
The take-it-or-leave-it option allows small penalties to overcome social dilemmas.
@en
P2093
P2860
P356
P1476
The take-it-or-leave-it option allows small penalties to overcome social dilemmas.
@en
P2093
Karl Sigmund
Tatsuya Sasaki
Ulf Dieckmann
Åke Brännström
P2860
P304
P356
10.1073/PNAS.1115219109
P407
P577
2012-01-09T00:00:00Z