Rewards and the evolution of cooperation in public good games.
about
Group Cooperation without Group Selection: Modest Punishment Can Recruit Much Cooperation.Voluntary rewards mediate the evolution of pool punishment for maintaining public goods in large populations.Collective punishment is more effective than collective reward for promoting cooperation.Impact of Social Reward on the Evolution of the Cooperation Behavior in Complex Networks.Antisocial rewarding in structured populations.Solving the collective-risk social dilemma with risky assets in well-mixed and structured populations.Antisocial pool rewarding does not deter public cooperation.The evolution of anti-social rewarding and its countermeasures in public goods games.
P2860
Q33360516-E7F8E306-C943-4DB1-975B-D9674E91CF47Q33562314-1FA5B349-3F4B-43E3-A457-8A98ED26FFE5Q36346245-1FF5F399-E67D-48DB-A9D4-FBFA7CB51C62Q37598437-25BD6C4D-B78C-4292-BB8A-D5AA36B085B3Q41109522-95A33A6C-D578-4BDE-892E-2194BF4E2DF6Q45950663-B55EC65D-F946-4827-B262-7E7F2E6EEC9AQ51076642-77DE3B29-A02B-458B-93DC-AA4E5801F156Q51391553-187A09EA-0C49-46C0-8A89-2AFC9422A5DA
P2860
Rewards and the evolution of cooperation in public good games.
description
2014 nî lūn-bûn
@nan
2014年の論文
@ja
2014年論文
@yue
2014年論文
@zh-hant
2014年論文
@zh-hk
2014年論文
@zh-mo
2014年論文
@zh-tw
2014年论文
@wuu
2014年论文
@zh
2014年论文
@zh-cn
name
Rewards and the evolution of cooperation in public good games.
@en
type
label
Rewards and the evolution of cooperation in public good games.
@en
prefLabel
Rewards and the evolution of cooperation in public good games.
@en
P2860
P356
P1433
P1476
Rewards and the evolution of cooperation in public good games.
@en
P2093
Satoshi Uchida
P2860
P304
P356
10.1098/RSBL.2013.0903
P577
2014-01-29T00:00:00Z